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PREFACE

This thesis is presented in the hope of shedding some new light
on the role which a neutral state can play in the wartime planning of
a belligerent nation.

As an illustration of this hypothesis, I have

chosen to examine German policy toward Sweden in World War Two.

I

believe the approach to be an original one, and, to my knowledge, no
similar work exists.

In the study, I have attempted to acknowledge

all sources from which I drew quotations or ideas, but unless other
wise cited, the Interpretations and conclusions are entirely my own.
Like any historian, I have based my conclusions on the material
at hand, and it is possible that different sources, unknown to me,
would provide a varied interpretation.

Certainly many of the original

German documents dealing with this problem were lost or destroyed dur
ing the war, or have remained unpublished.

With this limitation In

mind, I do not presume that either the text or the conclusions derived
therefrom are immutable.
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INTRODUCTION

In wartime, a great deal of literature is devoted to the policies
of the various belligerent nations.

Their basic strategy and condact

of the war are subject to the closest scrutiny and analysis.

However,

any examination of the role of the neutral nations during a period of
hostilities is likely to be confined to their efforts to maintain a
neutral position in the face of pressures to get involved on one side
or the other.

What is often ignored is the fact that a belligerent

power may actually have a policy which takes into account the neutrality
of a particular country and attempts to utilize this neutrality to serve
its own interests.
In the Second World War, very few European nations were permitted
to remain outside the sphere of hostilities.

Whether for military

reasons or to fulfill Hitler's expansionist dreams, one after another
of the neutral nations fell under the advance of the German Wehrmacht.
In the North, both Denmark and Norway were victims of German conquest,
while Finland became a battleground for both Russian and German forces.
Sweden, alone of the northern countries, escaped from the war virtually
unscathed.
Why was Sweden allowed to preserve her neutrality when the simi
lar policies of her neighboring states were all but ignored?

To find

the answer, it is necessary to examine the basic aims of German policy
toward Sweden and to evaluate these alms, taking into account the wil
lingness of the Swedish government to cooperate with Germany to an
extent which made their achievement possible.

This task is simplified
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by the fact that Hitler had one over-riding interest in Sweden— the
iron ore which he imported from that country and which was essential
to the German war effort.

Without the Swedish ©re, German industry

would have difficulty manufacturing the weapons and equipment neces
sary to sustain a war machine of the size Hitler had created.

In fact,

the German industrialist, Fritz Thyssen, who had escaped t© Switzerland,
wrote that "without the ore from Sweden it is possible to calculate the
date upon which Germany must capitulate."^
Sweden had a traditional policy of neutrality dating from the
Napoleonic wars.

In the First World War, some factions in Swedish

politics had favored the German cause, but Sweden had remained offi
cially neutral.

By 1939, pro-German sentiment in Sweden had cooled

somewhat, although there still remained close ties between the two
countries.

At the beginning of the Second World War, Sweden pledged

herself to maintain trade relations with all belligerents, and Hitler
had little doubt that Germany's supplies of iron ore would continue to
flow from the Swedish mines.
The western powers, however, also recognized Germany's depend
ence on Swedish iron, and Hitler's conquest of Denmark and Norway in
April, 191*0, was in part the ultimate result of an Allied attempt to
cut off German supplies ©f this precious commodity.

Sweden was not

invaded, but she was now under tighter pressure than before to comply
with German demands.

From the spring of 191*0 until the end of 191*2,

-^General Sir Edmund Ironside, The Ironside Diaries. 1937-191*0.
ed. Gol. Roderick Macleod and Denis Kelly(Londons Constable and Co.,
Ltd., 1962), p. 186.

Hitler used Sweden much as he wished, forcing the Swedes to grant con
cessions of a distinctly unneutral character®

After 19l*2, the German

forces met increasing Allied resistance, and the demands which Hitler
made upon Sweden were increasingly resisted or ignored altogether®

By

the beginning of 191*5, German policy toward Sweden had primarily become
one of reaction? Sweden was following an independent policy and even
making some requests of Germany's leaders which earlier in the war she
would not have dared to consider.
The inevitable conclusion which must be drawn, and the paradox
which is illustrated throughout the thesis, is simply that the success
of Germany's policy toward Sweden at any given moment was largely depend
ent on the entire war situation.

When Germany was in a position to

invade Sweden and enforce her demands, she had no real need to do so,
because the Swedes were already cooperating! by the time Sweden began
actively to resist German demands, Hitler was too involved with his
other commitments to do anything about itj and by the end of the war,
the German leaders were actually complying with Swedish policy in cer
tain instances and an active German policy, as such, had fallen into
abeyance.
The various phases which have been described will be presented
in a largely chronological order.

The policy followed by Germany at

various times will often be seen as a reaction to the measures taken
by other nationsj thus if at times the study seems unduly concerned with
Swedish or even British policies, they are cited to bring the total
situation into perspective as Germany's leaders must have viewed It.
Another question which will be dealt with in the course of the

h
work concerns the failure of Germany to Invade Sweden at the time Norway
and Denmark were attacked and the result of this omission as it affected
the eventual outcome of the war.

Whether the obvious advantanges of an

occupation of Sweden would outweigh the possible disadvantages is a
matter which must be examined in the light of the actual policy which
Germany followed in this area.
It should be emphasized that this study presents a historical
evaluation of the wartime policy of one particular belligerent state
toward an individual neutral nation.

It is not Intended to attach any

universal validity to the conclusions drawn, as in each instance the
policy of a belligerent toward a neutral must be primarily determined
by Individual considerations.
The thesis is limited in one respect by the lack of original
sources for the latter years of the war.

An abundant supply of pub

lished material from German sources is available for the period from
1939-19k3t hut after 19k3t there are fewer sources dealing with German
policy toward Sweden and what has been written tends to be from the
Swedish or Allied viewpoint.

This in itself is significant, but the

reader should be aware of the limitation and judge the conclusions
accordingly.

CHAPTER I

GERMANY ANB SWEDISH NEUTRALITY

On September 1, 1939 > the armed forces of the Third Reich crossed
the border into Poland.

On that same day, Sweden declared her neutral

ity in a brief document which referred to the common declaration of
neutrality that had been drawn up by the five northern States in the
previous year.
The Swedish announcement came as no surprise to the German gov
ernment, for it reaffirmed a position which had long been regarded as a
principal feature of Swedish foreign policy.

Sweden had remained

tral in the First World War, in spite of pressure by various Interests
within her borders.

When world tension again seemed to point to con

flict, the Swedish government played host at Stockholm to representa
tives of Iceland, Norway, Denmark, and Finland.

On May 27, 1938, the

members of the Stockholm Conference announced the adoption of a revised
set of neutrality rules, based on the previously accepted regulations
issued in 1912.

The revisions concerned purely technical points of

procedure, such as the restriction of military flights over neutral
territory; there was no mention of trade relations with a belligerent
power.

The agreement was not Intended as a military alliance, but was

merely an indication of common goals of the signatory powers.
In a Reichstag speech on April 28, 1939, Hitler offered non
aggression pacts to the northern countries, and negotiations on these
'v
lines soon followed between Germany and the governments of Sweden,
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Norway, Denmark, Finland, Estonia, and Latvia.

Latvia and Estonia

readily accepted the proposal, bat the other countries were more hesi
tant.

The Swedish foreign minister, lickard Sandler, opposed the

treaty and attempted to persuade the other northern governments to
reject Hitler's offer.

Sandler doubted that such an agreement was

"in keeping with the existing neutrality of the Scandinavian countries,"
and felt that it might also "be interpreted to mean that, in the event
of war, the Scandinavian countries could only make deliveries to Germany,
and not to Germany's opponents as well."

His views prevailed, and

Norway and Finland went along with Sweden in refusing the offer, stat
ing that the idea of a German attack on them was inconceivable.

Den

mark, in a more vulnerable position, felt bound to accept and signed a
non-aggression pact with Germany on May 31, 1939.
In the spring of 1939, the German government was also attempting
to determine what Sweden's trade policy would be in the event of a war.
Sweden and Finland were engaged in an attempt to build joint defensive
fortifications in the Aaland Islands,

2

and the German navy suggested

S.,
Department of State. Documents on German Foreign Policy.
19I&-I9h5. Series D (Washington, l.C.s U. S. Government Printing Office,
195&*19&n), VI, 1*68. Hereafter cited as DGFP.
9
The Aaland Islands, located between Sweden and Finland, at the
entrance to the Gulf of Bothnia, were largely populated by Swedes, but
had been awarded to Finland by the League of Nations in 1921. The
islands had been demilitarized since 1856, and this was confirmed by
Ishe Aaland Convention of 1921. When in 1939, both Sweden and Finland
felt that the islands should be fortified, the ten signatory nations of
the Aaland Convention were asked to grant their permission. On May 2,
Germany agreed, as did the other nations involved. However, during the
summer of 1939, the Soviet Union objected violently to the proposal,
which cooled enthusiasm for it in Finland and Sweden. The work on the
fortifications was scarcely begun when war broke out in September and
further work on the project was cancelled.

that negotiations on this issme might be extended to include discussions
on the continuation of iron ore shipments to Germany.

The Swedish gov

ernment was asked for a declaration of the trade formula which Sweden
would apply in wartime, and it finally responded on April 21 with a
statement thats
Sweden who has repeatedly expressed her determination to
preserve neutrality in the event of war will also conduct her
commercial relations during the period of hostilities in a
manner appropriate to that e n d
The Swedish declaration was very similar to a formula which had previS

ously been suggested by the German foreign minister and seemed to
satisfy those who had feared that German trade Interests might suffer
in the event of a war.
As war approached, the group of nations known as the Oslo Powers,
which Included Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Belgium, and
Luxembourg, sent representatives to a conference at Brussels which met
on August 23, 1939-

The Belgian king broadcast an appeal for peace in

the name of all the assembled states, and stressed the desire of all to
avoid becoming involved in the conflict which seemed increasingly in
evitable.

An offer to mediate the dispute went unheeded by Germany«

There were also attempts by private individuals to lessen the
growing tension between Germany and Great Britain.

One of the most

notable efforts was achieved by a Swedish civil engineer, Birger Dahlerus, who had lived in both Great Britain and Germany, and was a friend
of the Luftwaffe commander, Hermann Goerlng.

From the first of July,
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Bahlerus made many trips between London and Berlin in an attempt to per
suade Individuals on both sides to come to an agreement.

He did succeed

in arranging a meeting on August 7 between seven British businessmen
and several Germans, Including Goering.

The British representatives,

who were all acting as private individuals, attempted to convince Goering of the seriousness with which Great Britain viewed Germany’s actions
in the Polish situation, but the meeting accomplished little.

Dahlerus

persisted in his efforts until after the war had actually started on
September 1, but the Germans, with perhaps the exception of Goering,
seemed determined to carry out the course Hitler had previously set
down and all the attempts at mediation came to nothing.^
On September 1, the German state secretary, von Weizsaecker, sent
a note to Stockholm stating that the German minister, Frirnz zu Wied, was
to make the following declaration to the Swedish foreign ministers
We are resolved, in accordance with the friendly relations
existing between our countries, not to injure, in any circum
stances, the inviolability and integrity of Sweden and at all
times to respect the territory of the Swedish State.
Von Weizsaecker then added that Germany expected Sweden to pursue a
policy of strict neutrality, and particularly hoped that Sweden would
not allow other nations to interfere in her affairs.
ence did occur,

If such interfer

Germany would naturally act to protect her interests.^

^Por Dahlerus' testimony on the events preceding the war, sees
International Military Tribunal, Ifrial of the Major War Criminals Before
the International Military Tribunal (Nurembergg International Military
Tribunal, 19h7),IX, k$l~k9l°
*DGFP. VII, 502-503.
£
Ibid.. VII, 5©3« This latter provision was also stated in a
similar German declaration to Norway, but was omitted in the case of
Finland.

9

On September 3, a special envoy from Germany, Ulrich von Hassell^
together with Prinz zu Wled, called upon Swedish Prime Minister Per
Albin Hansson and Foreign Minister Sandler.

The purpose of the visit

was to assure continued economic relations between the two countries.
Von Hassell referred to the statement made by the Swedish government
on April 21, which declared Sweden's Intentions to conduct her wartime
trade policy in a manner consistent with her neutral position.

He

stressed the importance of Swedish goods to the German economy and ex
pressed the hope that the current trade ratios between Germany and
Sweden would be maintained.

The Swedish ministers appeared to agree

to von Hassell's requests, although they did not discuss the ratio in
much detail.

They cautioned the Germans that Sweden's needs would come

first, but any restrictions on imports would be equally applied to all
nations with which Sweden was carrying on trade relations and which
respected Swedish neutrality.

7

The progress made by von Hassell during the discussions in
Stockholm might be attributed, in part, to the favorable effect created
by the concurrent delivery of a large supply of German coal, a material
vital to the Swedish economy.

The coal shipment was widely reported in

the Swedish press and served to illustrate Germany's desire for con
tinued trade under wartime conditions.
During the autumn of 1939, the Germans continued to assure Sweden
of their peaceful intentions.

On October 6, Hitler made a speech in

which he statedi

^Ibid.. VII, ^hl-JjliS. Von Hassell's instructions for the Stock
holm visit are cited on pp. 396-397.

Gennany has never had any conflicts of interest or even
points of controversy with the Northern States? neither has
she any today® Sweden and Norway have both been offered non
aggression pacts with Germany and have both refused them solely
because they do not feel themselves threatened in any way®®
While the war continued, Sweden made every effort to bring about
an early settlement of the conflict.

In October, the Swedish King,

Gustav ?, made it known that he and the other Scandinavian rulers would
be willing to mediate between the belligerents if they were requested
to do so, but it was up to the powers at war to take the initiative®
Hitler was cool to the proposal, feeling that Great Britain would not
agree to his demands, and no response was forthcoming from the western
powers.

Another attempt by Bahlerus to intervene was rejected by the

German foreign office.
While neutrality was the principal tenet of Sweden's strategy,
it was at the same time a policy of "armed neutrality."

The small

Swedish army was quickly expanded to meet wartime conditions and her
defenses strengthened against the possibility of invasion®
of expansion was reflected in Sweden's military budget.

The degree

For 1938=1939,

the budget totaled only $30,000,000, but in 1939-191*0, it was increased
to $1*00,000,000.

The defenses against air attack were especially good,

for Sweden possessed the famous Bofors armaments plant, which produced
the world's finest anti-aircraft guns.

The hardest area to defend was

the coastline composed of countless bays and inlets.

In order to

^Office of the U® S® Chief of Counsel for Prosecution of Axis
War Criminality, Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (Washington, D„ C,§
U, S* Government Printing Office,~19iio~19a$5, X, 739®
^Franklin B. Scott, The U. S® and Scandinavia (Cambridge, Mass.?
Harvard University Press, 1930), p. 267®
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maintain a proper coastal defense, naval facilities had to be increased
and special fortifications constructed In the more vulnerable points»
The trump card in the Swedish defense system, however, was not of a
strictly military nature.

In case of attack, the Swedes had constructed

a system whereby they would sabotage their own iron mines and render
them unworkable.

If Germany should decide to invade Sweden, the result

would indeed be a costly victory for Hitler because of Germany8s great
dependence on exports of Swedish iron ore.

Thus the Swedes had in their

economy their best weapon against German attack.
The close economic ties between Germany and Sweden are a factor
which must be examined in some detail.

The importance of Swedish iron

ore to German industry can best be illustrated by the fact that more
than 5© per eent of Germany’s iron ore imports during the 1930’s came
from the Swedish mines.

10

,

From 1939-191*2, the amount came to approxi-

mately ten million tons per year.

The Swedish ore is especially high=

grade, containing "55-67$ of iron, as against the 20“i*0$ of most other

11

European ore-fields."

It was of particular value to Germany’s arma»

ment industry and most of the principal companies such as Krupp and
Thyssen had their plants specially adapted to utilize this rich ore.
A continued supply was essential to maintain the high industrial output
necessary for a wartime economy.

In fact, the industrialist, Fritz

Thyssen, was reported to have told Hitler that "the war would be won

^Joachim Joesten, Stalwart Sweden (Garden City, N„ Y.s Doubleday,
Doran and Go., 191*3), p. 65. This is in reference to fie value of the
ore rather than the tonnage.
■^Andrew 0o O ’Dell. The Scandinavian World (Londons Longmans,
Green and Co., Ltd., 195?), p. 1*33.

12

12
by the side which secured control of the Swedish ores.18
The principal difficulty facing the Germans, provided Sweden was
willing to export the ore, was the problem of transportation.

The

largest ore deposits in Sweden are in the northern part of the country
near the mining centers of Kiruna and Glllivare.

The first includes

the Kirunavaara ore field, thought to contain the largest single iron
ore deposit in the world.
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Besides the northern mines there are ore

deposits in central Sweden near the town of Bergsiagen.

The ore from

the Bergsiagen mines contains less iron percentage than the Lapland ore.
During the war it was used primarily for home consumption, although
some was exported to Germany.

However, It was the richer northern ore

which Germany found most vital to her economy.

The difficulty lay in

the fact that there were only two ports from which the ore was exported.
Hie port of Lulei on the Baltic was one of these.
bound four or five months out of the year.

But Lulea is ice-

Thus the major outlet for

the ore was the port of Narvik on the northern coast of Norway.

Narvik

is one hundred miles north of the arctic circle, but, because of the
gulf-stream, is free of ice throughout the winter.

The ports were both

connected to the ore-fields by a Swedish state railway, the “Iron Ore
Line.”
Once the ore had been delivered to Narvik, it was loaded onto
German ships for their return voyage.

Although the journey was long,

it was simplified by the fact that the Norwegian coastline is bounded

12W. N. Medlicott, The Economic Blockade (Londons Longmans,
Green and Co., 19!?2), I,
^Joesten, p. 60.

by a continuous chain of island archipelagoes* which form a deep chan**
nel called the Leads.

The Leads are part of Norway®s territorial

waters, so the German cargos were relatively safe as long as they did
not venture outside this zone.

The Allies soon realized this, and as

the war continued serious efforts were made to stop the flow of iron
ore through the Leads to Germany.
Iron ore was not the only material which Germany imported from
Sweden.

She also Imported “copper, ferro-alloys, chalk and limestone

and pyritesj certain lumber and wood products, especially sulphite
Ik
cellulosej butter, oil cake, hides, skins, and tanning extracts.“
Germany also imported large quantities of Swedish ball-bearings, which
were vital for the German

aircraft industry.

The Svenska Kullager-

fabriken or SKF Company, Sweden's largest producer of high-quality
ball-b®arings, continued against the protests of the Allies to supply
ball-bearings to Germany until the autumn of 191*1*.
On the other side, Sweden provided a market for certain German
goods.

These were notably machinery, textiles, chemicals, and in parti

cular, supplies of coke and coal.

The latter were essential to Swedish

industry and had to be imported since Sweden has only enough coal de
posits to supply 5 per cent of her needs.
Through a combination of an active trade policy with Sweden,
coupled with trade agreements between the two countries, the Germans
hoped to tie Sweden more closely to their own economy.
conference on October 23, 1939, it was stated that8

^Medlicott, p. 11*1.

At a Fuehrer

lit

The attitude of the neutral nations toward the war and toward
Germany must be changed completely by clear and definite dir
ectives and by measures on the part of Germany. More than
ever before it must be driven home to the neutrals that they
can never emerge from this war as laughing victors in the face
of an economically destroyed or weakened Germany. ^
From the outbreak of the war, negotiations for a German-Swedish
trade agreement were in progress in Stockholm.

At first the Swedes

seemed to favor such an agreement, but several factors threatened to
disrupt the talks.

In September, Swedish public opinion was aroused

by the torpedoing of two Swedish ships carrying goods to England.

The

director of Germany's Economic Policy Department warned that ill feel
ing of this sort could disrupt the ore traffics
"Not only must the ores be sold, they also have to be dug and
shipped," and for that reason the mood of the workers in the
mines and loading plants must also be c o n s i d e r e d . ^
On October 10, it was announced at a Fuehrer conference that submarines
were not to interfere with merchant shipping in Scandinavian waters,
for fear of sinking Scandinavian ships.

17

The economic negotiations

were reopened on October 17, but new conflicts soon arose to promote
discord among the delegates.
The German government was greatly disturbed by the amount of
merchant shipping that passed through Swedish territorial waters.
Sweden claimed not only the usual three-mile limit recognized under
international law, but insisted that her territorial waters extended

Germany, Kriegsmarine Oberkommando, Fuehrer Conferences On
Matters Dealing with the German Navy. 1939bl9ii.f> (on microfilm),L939,
p. 27. Hereafter cited as Fuehrer Conferences.
l6DGFP. VIII, 171.
17
Fuehrer Conferences. 1939, p. 12.
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to four miles from the coastline.

The German navy was naturally con-

cermed with this since it was attempting to lay mine-fields in the
Baltic to restrict enemy shipping.

As a high-ranking naval officer

explained the problems
A large part of the merchant vessels carrying goods from the
Baltic to the North Sea and beyond actually went through the
gap in our mine barrage and through the three-mile zone. This
was done by a large number of ships every day. The Naval Staff
was convinced that they were mostly ships which were afraid of
control by German naval vessels
The German navy felt that a large percentage of this traffic could be
reduced if mine fields were laid in the fourth mile claimed by Sweden.
The German foreign office was duly consulted by the naval staffs but
here the plan encountered some opposition.

The Economic Policy Depart

ment hesitated to deprive Sweden of her fourth territorial mile when
the economic discussions were in progress! it would make the task of
the negotiators much more difficult, particularly since Germany could
only pay with commodity exports for about half the iron ore she wished
Sweden to deliver and would have to depend for the rest on credit and
"the goodwill of the Swedes."

19

The foreign office preferred to post-

pone a decision until the economic questions were settled.
However, in spite of these objections, the naval staff considered
it necessary to take measures against shipping within the disputed
fourth mile and informed the German foreign office of its decision.
Accordingly, a note was presented to the Swedish government on October
31, stating "that Germany would continue to recognize only the standard

18DGFP. VIII, 3U1.
19Ibid.. VIII, 3i|0.

See also pp. 338-339.

16
20
three-mile limit.”

As the German economic experts had predicted, the

Swedish government was not disposed to relinquish its claim and sent a
note of protest to Berlin on November 1*.

The repercussions threatened

to disrupt the trade negotiations then in progress, but the German
delegates were empowered to discuss the matter of sea warfare with the
Swedes in an effort to work out their differences over the conference
table.

On November 2h, the German navy laid mines within the fourth

mile of Swedish waters, but outside the three-mile zonej this closed
the channel to larger ships requiring deeper water and served to streng
then German control of the Baltic.
Another cause for conflict was the seizure of Swedish merchant
vessels by Germany.

On November 29, The Times of London reported that

thirty-seven Swedish ships were currently being held by the German
contraband authorities, although "all but three have neutral destinations."

21

The Germans were afraid that the ships might be sold to

England if they were allowed to leave the Baltic.
Although Sweden protested against the German mine fields within
the four-mile zone, the German government complained that the Swedes
were laying mine fields in the area surrounding the Aaland Islands and
several German patrol boats had been sunk as a result.

This complicated

the war against the merchant shipping of other nations and could only
be regarded as a measure designed to hinder German interests.

On the

other hand, Sweden refused to mine her territorial waters within the

20DGFP. VIII, 31*1.

^The Times Weekly Edition (London), November 29, 1939, p. 6.

17

three-mile zone,

A note from the German foreign office requesting the

Swedes to lay mines in the Falsterbo Channel was rejected by the Swedish
22

government.

In spite of these conflicts, Germany and Sweden finally megottated a trade agreement which was signed on December 22, 1939°

During

191*0, the Swedish government would allow the issuance of export licenses
for Swedish goods bound for Germany, “as a rule up to the amounts which,
according to the official Swedish export statistics of 1938, were ex23
ported to Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland,"
Certain exceptions to
the 1938 figure were itemized, including the projected export to Germany
in 191*0 of 10,000,000 tons of iron ore.

However, it was specifically

noted that two or three million tons of iron ore would have to be exported via Narvik in order to achieve this export figure.

21*

Germany,

for her part, promised increased deliveries of coal and coke to Sweden,
although the Swedes would have to provide rail transport for the bulk
of the shipments.

Other products to be exported by Germany included

rolling mill products, coke pig iron, and table salt.
Another section of the agreement concerned the prices to be
charged for the various exported commodities.

For the time being, it

was decided to keep the prices for Swedish iron ore and most German
goods at the levels "in force in 1939 before September 1."

2$

However,

the possibility of a moderate price rise to be agreed upon by both

^ Fuehrer Conferences, 1939, I, Part 1, 62, and 19i*0, I, 1.
mi,

2kIbid

561*.
2% b i d . , ¥111, 566.
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countries was not excluded0 fhe Important thing was that a balance
must be maintained between the value of the Swedish and German commod
ities exchanged.

On January 12, 191*0, an additional agreement was

signed raising the value of certain listed items.
While the regular economic negotiations were in progress, Sweden
also requested the German government"s permission to purchase stock of
military supplies from Germany.

In December, the Swedish military

attach^ submitted a list of war material desired by the Swedish govern
ment to the Defense Economy Staff in Berlins included were anti-tank and
anti-aircraft guns, field howitzers, submachine guns, hand grenades, and
armored cars.
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fhe request was relayed to Hitler who agreed that

Sweden could be allowed to purchase surplus material from Germany, in
sofar as the sale would not hinder the German war effort.

On January

27, 19h0, an agreement was signed in which the German government prom
ised to deliver arms and ammunition to Sweden in exchange for gold and
additional shipments of raw materials.

The items Germany could spare,

however, amounted to only a fraction of the total Sweden had requested.
While Sweden sent a large proportion of her exports to Germany,
she also maintained her trade relations with the western powers.

On

December 7, a trade agreement was signed between Sweden and Great
Britain.

The British were primarily concerned with the export to

Germany of Swedish iron ore and hoped to persuade the Swedish government

^Ibid., VIII, 522. It is a bit difficult to understand why the
Swedes, possessing the famous Bofors works, were importing German anti
aircraft guns. Perhaps the explanation lies in the fact that at this
time Sweden was also supplying arms to Finland.

to place a limit on these shipments.

Daring the negotiations for the

agreement which took place in October, the Swedes, feeling German pres
sure, refused to make any reductions.

The most they would do was to

make a secret understanding with Great Britain that they would try to
27

restrict ©re exports by “technical obstructions.“ ' What these were
the Swedes did not say.

The British delegates hoped that the Swedish

promise of "technical obstructions" would soon be fulfilled.

However,

at the end of November, it was reported that the Swedish mines were
being worked twenty-four hours a day instead of the usual sixteen.

The

Ore Line was also running eighteen trains a day to Narvik instead of
the usual ten.

The Swedes explained that the mines were frequently

worked on this shift during the winter, so that a. large supply of iron
ore could be stored at Narvik before it froze in the ears during the
colder months of the year.
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The reply did not seem very satisfactory

to the British, but Sweden was obviously looking after her own economic
interests.

Sweden did agree not to re-export goods which had been pre

viously exported from Great Britain.

The only exception to this was

that finished products made from imported raw materials could be resold
to British or Allied customers.
sold to Germany.

No goods in this category could be

A shipping agreement signed on December 28, 1939,

provided that if possible all products transported between Sweden and
2

<

Great Britain should be carried in both directions by Swedish vessels.
The fact that Sweden was able to come to an agreement with Great

2?Medlicott, p. 11*6.

Britain, based on the assumption that trade with the West would not be
restricted by her proximity to Germany, Is Itself significant.,

Sweden

as a neutral nation had announced her intention to conduct trade rela~
tlons with both powers.

As long as Sweden continued to supply quanti

ties of iron ore and other raw materials needed by German industry,
Germany's leaders were reluctant to place any pressure upon the Swedes
which might result in a negative attitude on the part of the Swedish
government.

The terns of the German-Swedlsh trade agreements were ample

proof that any promises Sweden might have made to the Allies were not
sufficiently binding to curtail to any great extent Swedish exports to
Germany.
During the winter of 1939-19UO, the attention of Europe was
focused on the conflict which broke out on November 10 between Russia
and Finland.

Germany was bound to Russia by a non-aggression treaty,

and much as Hitler may have disliked Russian expansion In the North, he
could not openly intervene.

But he could stand silently by while Sweden

gave aid to the Finns.
On December 19, Bluecher, the German minister in Finland, re
ported to von Weizsaecker that it was rumored that Germany had informed
the Swedish government of possible German military action against Sweden
if she Intervened in the Finnish war.

Von Weizsaecker replied that the

assertion was untrue; no such warning had been made to Sweden and the
position of Germany in the war was one of strict neutrality.
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Sentiment in Sweden almost universally favored the Finnish cause.

3°DGFP. VIII, 558-£59.
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The foreign minister, Rickard Sandler, was an advocate of direct inter™
t
vention, for he feared that Russia’s expansionist aims included Sweden
and the Aaland Islands as well as Finland.
other circles.

But caution prevailed in

Sandler was removed from office in Beeember and replaced

by Christian Guenther, a career diplomat. Swedish policy now evolved
31
into something which might be termed "non-belligerent interventionisms,11
The Finnish war was considered outside the sphere of the general European war, and thus Sweden could give assistance to one of the belliger
ents without seriously endangering her status as a neutral in the latter
conflict.
The Swedes collected war material for Finland and contributed a
total of ”80,000 rifles, 500 automatic weapons, 85 anti-tank guns, 112
field guns and howitzers, 101* A.A. guns, 50,000,000 cartridges, 300,000
artillery shells, and 25 planes, as well as petrol and equipment.®
Some of these weapons were merely loaned
after the war.
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to the Finns, to be returned

There were also collections taken up among the Swedes

to provide clothing, food, and medical supplies for the Finnish people.
Sweden did not send regular troops to Finland, but permitted the re
cruitment of Swedish volunteers.

She volunteers numbered nearly 9,000

men and were sent across the border, fully equipped, to assist the Finns
in their struggle.
She German government was fully aware of all this activity,

©n

^Henning Friis, ed., Scandinavia Between East and West (Ithacas
Cornell University Press, 1950), p. 277.
3^Carl Gustaf Etail Mannerheim, She Memoirs of Marshall Mannerhelm (Hew Yorks E. P. Dutton and Co., Inc., 195k), p. 377.

February 10, 19^0, the director of the Political Department, Woermann,
wrote in a memorandums
According to our information Sweden . . . permitted the
departure of volunteers, who, however, if they were members
of the Swedish armed forces, had to resign from the service.
We had not taken any official stand on this action by Sweden.
A different situation would naturally arise if forces of the
powers with whom we were at war should arrive in Sweden or
Norway en route to Finland. That would be an issue of im
portance to us.33
The possibility of Allied interference in the Finnish conflict
was very real.

The western powers were not only concerned for the

future of Finlandj they were also aware that any aid sent to Finland
would probably have to pass through Norway and Sweden, thus presenting
the opportunity to seize control of the Swedish ore facilities and pre
vent the further shipment of iron ore to Germany.

As early as mid-

December, the British government was considering a plan to land an
expedition at Narvik for the purpose of supporting the Finns and oc
cupying the northern ore fields.

Winston Churchill, then First Lord

of the Admiralty, was an enthusiastic supporter of the proposal, al
though he wished to extend the venture to include the mining of Norwe
gian waters.

He wrote?

If Narvik were to become a kind of Allied base to supply the
Finns, it would certainly be easy to prevent the German ships
loading ore at the port and sailing safely down the Leads to
Germany.^
On February *>, the Supreme Allied War Council met in Paris to discuss
the possibility of intervention.

It was decided to send an expedition

33dgfp,VIII, 762.
3%inston L. S. Churchill. The Second World War. Vol. I? The
Gathering Storm (Boston? Houghton, Mifflin Co., 19li$~i9f>3), p. $kko
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to Narvik which would first secure the G&XXivare ore fields and then
proceed to the Finnish front via the iron-ore port of Lulea*
would also take place at Stavanger, Bergen, and Trondheim.

I1?

Landings
Church

ill's proposal to mine Norwegian waters had been shelved for the time
being by the British government*
The Allies also planned to ask the Norwegian and Swedish govern
ments for permission to cross their territory*

The consent of Sweden

was particularly necessary since the forces from Narvik would have to
use the iron ore railway to cross into Sweden.

There were no roads

along this route and the railway was electrified! if the Swedes decided
to cut off the power, the entire expedition could be stranded in Narvik*
However, both Norway and Sweden refused to consider the Allied proposal,
fearing that compliance on their part might drag them into war with
Germany.

They did permit the shipment to Finland of armaments from

the Allies and the passage of "volunteersa from France and England,
but they would not agree to the transit of Allied troops through their
territory.
By the beginning of March, everyone but the western powers was
exerting pressure on Finland to put a speedy end to the war.

The Chief

of the British Imperial General Staff, General Ironside, put the matter
very succinctly when he wrote than an armistice was desireds
(i) By the Germans because they want neither the Russians
nor the Allies in GSllivare before the Gulf of Bothnia
is clear of ice.

Rear Admiral Paul Auphan and Jacques Mordal, The French Navy
in World War Two (Annapoliss H* S. Naval Institute, 19597,
and Ironside, p. 215*

(ii) By the Russians because they have had enough embarrass
ment already and because they cannot satisfy the German
demands for raw materials.
(iii) By the Swedes because they do notwish to become a bone
of contention and mixed up in the w a r . 36
The German point of view was aptly stated on

February22 by

theminis

ter in Finland?
. ."."there is no doubt in my mind . . . that the neatest
solution would be to compose the Finnish-Russian conflict
before the Western guardian angels have time to arrive and
take the Swedish ore, instead of Finland, under their wing.
During the ensuing peace negotiations between Russia and Finland,
the Swedish government acted as an intermediary and on March 12, the
Winter War finally came to an end.

The terms of the Peace of Moscow

were more harsh than the Swedes had anticipated, but Finland was in no
position to refuse the Russian demands.
For Germany the situation was quite favorable.

With the return

to peace, the Allies had no further excuse to intervene in Scandinavia,
and the Norwegian and Swedish governments had both shown, to Hitler’s
satisfaction, that they would resist any attempts by the western powers
to involve them in an operation inimical to German Interests.

German

industry could now feel assured of a plentiful supply of iron ore
flowing uninterruptedly from the Swedish mines to Germany.

•^Ironside, pp. 22li-225,
3 7 _

CHAPTER II

THE NORWEGIAN INVASION

With the conclusion of the Russo=-Finnish War, the British and
French comld no longer hope to land troops in Narvik under the guise
of aiding the Finnish cause.

However, the Allies were not Inclined to

let the Swedish ore slip that easily through their fingers, and a new
justification for Intervention was soon found in the continued viola
tion of Norwegian neutrality by German vessels.

The next phase in the

battle for the Swedish ore supplies was a struggle for control of the
water route through which the ore was shipped to Germany.
Shortly after the beginning of the war, there had appeared evid
ence that Germany was using Norwegian territorial waters for a variety
of purposes.

On October 9, 1939, the City of Flint, an American ship

carrying a British cargo, was captured in the North Atlantic by the
German pocket battleship Deutschland and a prize crew was put aboard.
The Germans also transferred 38 British prisoners, who had been taken
from the torpedoed ship Stone Gate onto the City of Flint, intending to
transport them to Germany through Norwegian territorial waters.

On

October 20, the ship stopped at TromsS to get water, and the Norwegian
authorities released the British prisoners.

The ship, however, was

allowed to continue her voyage and was escorted down the Leads by Nor
wegian warships as a precaution against action by ememy forces.

On

November 3, the ship docked at Haugesund a few miles south of Bergen.
The German captain pretended that there was illness aboard and sent for
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a doctor, but this story was soon proven false.

Under international

law, the City of Flint had no further justification for remaining in
port; the German crew was removed by Norwegian authorities and the ship
was returned to its American captain.
The Norwegian government had acted correctly in its handling of
the situation and had followed the rules laid down in the Hague Conven
tion of 1907.^

It had only released the ship when the German actio®

constituted a definite breach of Norwegian neutrality,,

In spite of

protests from Berlin, the Norwegian government refused to return the
City of Flint to German contrbl.
Another violation of Norwegian neutrality occurred in December,
1939, when three foreign ships were torpedoed within Norwegian terri
torial waters.

These were the British ships, the Thomas Walton, sunk

on December 8, and the Deptford, torpedoed on December 13, and a Greek
steamer, the Garaufalia, which was sunk on December 11.

On January 6,

191*0, the British government sent a note to the Norwegian government

^■"Convention (XIII) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral
Powers in Naval War," given In Herbert W. Briggs (ed.). The Law of
Nations (New Yorks Appleton-Century-Crofts, Inc., 1952;, pp. 103fP
1037.
"Article 10, The neutrality of a Power is not affected by the
mere passage through its territorial waters of war-ships or prizes
belonging to belligerents.
"Article 21. A prize may only be brought into a neutral port
on account of unseaworthiness, stress of weather, or want of fuel or
provisions. It must leave as soon as the circumstances which justified
its entry are at an end. If it does not, the neutral Power must order
it to leave at once} should it fail to obey, the neutral Power must
employ the means at its disposal to release it with its officers and
crew and to intern the prize crew,
"Article 22. A neutral Power must, similarly, release a prize
brought into one of its ports under circumstances other 1*he® those
referred to in Article 21."
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protesting these sinkings in a supposedly neutral area.

The note stated

that Norway?
had permitted Germany without protest to undertake naval opera
tions in Norwegian territorial waters. Should such incidents
be repeated, England would be compelled to act in the same
manner, that is, to operate with her naval forces in Norwegian
territorial waters.
In response to the British note, the Norwegian foreign minister, Dr.
Halvdan Koht, defended his country’s position, stating that there was
no proof that two of the ships had actually been within Norwegian terri
torial waters at the time of the sinking.

He also said that there was

no reliable evidence to substantiate the theory that any of the ships
had been torpedoed (although he admitted privately to the German minis■■3
ter, Braeuer, that some witnesses had claimed to have seen torpedoes).
The Swedish and Norwegian governments frequently consulted with one
another regarding problems of neutrality before taking joint action,
and in this case both Sweden and Norway urged Great Britain not to
Intervene in Norwegian waters.
In view of the strong Swedish and Norwegian statements, the
British did not immediately carry out their threat of intervention, but
it was clear that another incident might bring Norwegian waters into
the general theater of war.

On February 15, a German motor tanker, the

Altmark, the supply ship of the Admiral Graf Spee. entered Norwegian
territorial waters.

On board were 299 British merchant seamen wh© had

been captured from ships sunk by the Graf Spee and were being transported

2DGFP. VIII, 697.
3Ibid.. VIII, 698.
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to Germany as prisoners of war.

The British were aware of the Altmark8s

cargo and sent several destroyers to intercept her.

At the same time,

the Altmark was being escorted by Norwegian torpedo-boats on her southward course.

The Norwegians were informed by the British that the

Altmark carried prisoners, but they failed to make a thorough search
of the vessel to confirm these reports.

On February 18, the British

destroyer Gossack entered Norwegian territorial waters and sent a crew
to board the Altmark. in spite of Norwegian protests that the British
were violating their neutrality.

The prisoners were rescued, and several

German crewmen were killed when they resisted.

The British action def

initely constituted a violation of Norwegian neutrality, although the
British government declared that Germany had also violated Norway8s
neutrality by misusing her right of "innocent passage" by transporting
prisoners through Norwegian territorial waters,^
The German government was very concerned over the failure of the
Norwegian ships to protect the Altmark against interference.

The German

naval attache in Norway, Schrleber, held an interview with the Norwegian
naval commander, Admiral Diesen, who offered the explanations
"What is a little torpedo boat with two automatic weapons on
board to do against a cruiser? [sic] A single salvo would wipe
her out. Besides the ice was so heavy that our small Norwegian
boats were in no position to pursue the powerful British des
troyers." (Comment by Naval Attaches according to the captain
of the Altmark the ice was not that heavy.)
When 1 said that I, as an officer of the German Navy, found
it impossible to understand and approve the weak attitude of the
commander of the Norwegian torpedo boat, he replied only by
shrugging his shoulders.5

^Dr. Halvdan Koht, Norway Neutral and Invaded (New Yorks The
Macmillan Co., 192*1), p. 39.

%GFP. VIII, ?8l.
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The Norwegian government did send a note of protest to Great Britain,
but this act failed to impress the Germans as much as the fact that
British forces had intervened in Norwegian waters in the first place.
The effect on Germany’s military leaders may be seen from this remark
by Admiral Raeders
This incident proved without a doubt that Norway was completely
helpless to maintain Its neutrality even if the Norwegian gov
ernment wished to do so, which obviously not all authorities
did. It further showed that the British government had no
hesitation in violating Norway’s neutrality when the liberation
of prisoners was at stake. Now it seemed almost sure that the
English would not hesitate to occupy bases ashore in Norway if
they could dtr so without a fight. » . . Now at last the neces
sity of moving into Norway to forestall the enemy had to be
strongly considered,®
Germany had long held an interest in the strategic location of
the Norwegian coastline.

In 1929, Vice-Admiral Wolfgang Wegener pub

lished a book called The Strategy of World War, which was widely read
by German naval officers.

Wegener claimed that the main task of the

navy in wartime was to protect merchant shipping, and to do this Germany
must extend its bases of operation northward in order to stretch the
English blockade lines.

He criticized Germany’s failure to occupy

Norway in the First World War, pointing out that possession of Norweg
ian bases would allow Germany to "considerably outflank the English
strategic position from the north."

7

Both Hitler and the Naval Qom-

mander-im-Chief, Admiral Raeder, were familiar with Wegener’s ideas,
and at a Fuehrer conference on October 10, 1939, Raeder pointed out the

^Erich Raeder, Mjr Life (Annapoliss U. S. Naval Institute, I960),
pp. 306-307.
7T e lfo rd T a y lo r, The March o f Conquest (New Yorks Simon and
Schuster, 19!>8) , p. 83.
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Importance of obtaining submarine bases in Norway.

8

In December, TTidkun Quisling, the leader of the tiny Nazi-inspired
/
"Nasjonal Saraling" party in Norway, paid a visit to Germany. He came at
the request of Rosenberg, the expert on Nazi fifth-column activities
abroad, who arranged an interview with Admiral Raeder,,

Rosenberg also

sent a report to Raeder designed to acquaint him with a proposal by
Quisling to take over the Norwegian government» The Norwegian Storting,
or Parliament, had passed a resolution extending itself for a year,
starting January 12, a step contrary to the constitution.

With this

as a pretext, Quisling planned to achieve a political coup and gain the
support of the Norwegian army.

(Quisling was a former minister of war

and a major in the reserves, and had important connections in the armed
forces.)

During his visit to Germany, he hoped to persuade Hitler to

provide special training for a number of his followers who would then
return to Norway and attempt to seize key government positions in Oslo.
Once this was accomplished, contingents of the German army and navy
would be Invited by Quisling's new government to assist in the operation.

9
On December 12, Raeder talked with Quisling and his assistant,

Hagelin, and reported to Hitler thatg
Quisling is convinced that an agreement exists between England
and Norway regarding a possible occupation of Norway* Sweden
would then also turn against Germany* There is a very real ^
danger that Norway may be occupied by Britain, possibly soon.

®Fuehrer Conferences. 1939* I, Pt» If lU»
%azl Conspiracy and Aggression. I, 7l*0-7l*l.
Rosenberg to Admiral Raeder.
- ^Fuehrer Conferences. 1939, I, Ft. 1, 51;.

From a report by
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Raeder suggested that Hitler see Quisling, but warned "that a politician
like Quisling Blight have his own private axe to grind, and it might be
well to be cautious."

11

But Hitler was impressed with Quisling’s argu

ments and he ordered preparations begun for a possible German invasion
of Norway to forestall any British action.

Hitler also agreed to try

political methods at the same time; money and coal were to be sent to
Quisling’s group and Nazi political experts would assist in furthering
12
his plans to take over the Norwegian government.
fhe plans for a possible invasion were discussed throughout Jan
uary and February, 191*0.

The Altmark affair in particular pointed out

the necessity for action on the part of Germany.

On February 23,

Admiral Raeder and Hitler discussed the best policy with regard to the
maintenance of the iron ore traffic from Narvik.

Raeder stated that

while a continuance of Norwegian neutrality was the best solution,
Britain must not be permitted to occupy Norway*
That could not be undone; it would entail increased pressure on
Sweden, perhaps extension of the war to the Baltic, and cessa
tion of all ore supplies from Sweden. ’
While a German occupation of Norway might temporarily suspend the ore
traffic, the losses this involved would be preferable to the total loss
incurred if Britain conquered Norway.

Raeder added*

"If Germany occu

pies Norway, she can also exert heavy pressure on Sweden, which would

llRaeder, p. 30?.
TO

In spite of these preparations, Quisling was never taken fully
into the confidence of the Germans. The supplies promised by Hitler
were very slow in arriving and he was not notified in advance of the
impending invasion in April. In short, Hitler soon came to favor a
military rather than political solution to the problem.
13
Fuehrer Conferences, 191*0, I , 11*.
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then be obliged to meet all our demands.”^*
On March 1, Hitler issued a formal directive for the invasion of
Norway and Denmark. He stated thats
fhe development of the situation in Scandinavia requires the
making of all preparations for the occupation of Denmark and
Norway by a part of the Wehrmacht (Fall Weseruebung). This
operation should prevent British encroachment on Scandinavia
and the Baltic. Farther it should guarantee our ore base in
Sweden and give our Navy and Luftwaffe a wider start-line against
Britain.
General von Falkenhorst was directed to prepare and command the German
forces, but no definite date was set for the invasion at this time.
The inclusion of Denmark in Operation Weseruebung was Insisted upon by
the Luftwaffe commanders who felt that the occupation of the Danish
airfields was essential in order to shorten the distance of flights
between Germany and Norway.

16

During the month of March, plans for the Invasion were being
perfected with one eye on Allied moves in the northern area.

The end

of the Winter War on March 12 eased the situation somewhat, but the
Germans did not abandon their preparations.

In a Fuehrer conference on

March 26, Raeder informed Hitler that although there was little imme
diate danger of a British landing in Norway, the Allies had not given
up.

He predicted thats
They will make further attempts to disrupt German trade in neu
tral waters and to cause incidents, in, orderperhaps to create
a pretext for action against Norway, One object has been and
still is to cut off Germany’s imports from Narvik. . . . Sooner
or later Germany will be faced with the necessity of carrying
out operation '^Weseruebung."'iV

VIII, 831.
16,
Raeder, p . 309*

■^Fuehrer Conferences. 19^0, I , 22.
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Since this was the case, Raeder advised Hitler to strike promptly while
there was a sufficient period of darkness to cover the operation and
insure success.

He suggested April 7 as the target date.

Hitler agreed

that Operation Wesermebung had to be carried out, and on April 2, a
Fuehrer“s Directive was issued which announced that the invasion of
Denmark and Norway would begin on April 9, 19U©» at £sl5 A.M.
Meanwhile, the British and French were seeking a new approach to
prevent Swedish ore from reaching Germany via the Norwegian coastline.
On March 20, the former German steel magnate, Fritz Thyssen, reported
to the Allies that ‘“plants In the Ruhr were now shut down for three

„18
days a week owing to shortages of raw materials.11

If the Narvik

route could be cut, the greater shortage resulting from such action
might seriously damage the German war effort.
On March 28, at a meeting of the Allied Supreme War Council, it
was decided that the ore traffic must be stopped at all costs.

Within

a week, mines would be laid in the Norwegian heads to halt the ore
shipments from Narvik, and later in the spring, mines would be dropped
from aircraft near the Swedish port of Lulel.

In conjunction with the

former operation, the Allies also agreed to carry out Operation Royal
Marine, or the dropping of mines in the Rhine.

Since the mining of the

Leads would presumably be opposed by Germany, it was also planned to
have a small Allied force land at certain points on the Norwegian coast
line to secure these positions against possible German attack.

However,

the landing was only to be carried out if Norway agreed to cooperate

l8Medlicott, p. 192.

3k
and the Germans showed definite signs of military opposition.

19

Operation Royal Marine was planned for April Ij., and the mining
of the Leads, known by the code name Wilfred, was to follow on April £.,
But at the last minute the French backed out of the former operation in
spite of English protests, and on April 3, the British war cabinet post
poned the Norwegian operation until April 8.

On April 5, notes were

sent to both the Norwegian and Swedish governments warning them against
engaging in unfriendly acts, but making no direct mention of the pro
jected mine laying.

The mining in the Narvik area was actually begun

at l*s3© A.M. on April 8.

At £s3© A.M., a further note was handed to

the Norwegian foreign minister by the British and French representatives
in Oslo announcing that the Allied governments had taken steps to mine
certain vital areas within Norwegian territorial waters.

Both Norway

and Sweden instantly protested this violation of Norwegian neutrality.
The Norwegian government demanded that the mines be removed at once
and insisted that foreign warships should cease their intervention In
Norwegian waters.

No British troops had been landed as yet, although

several units were embarked upon warships in the Clyde, ready to sail
at a moment's notice.
The allied action in mining the Leads actually played right into
Hitler's hands.

The German invasion, already planned for the following

day, could now be represented to world opinion as a necessary counter
measure to "preserve" Norwegian independence from the encroachment of
the British and French forces.

19

In addition, the stir created in Norway

T a y lo r, p. 98j C h u rc h ill, Gathering Storm, pp. £78-579, and
Iro n s id e , p . 238.

y>
by the Allied operation helped to divert the attention of the Norwegian
authorities from the otherwise disturbing reports which were drifting
in from various points along the coastline.
The Norwegian government received several warnings of the ensuing
danger, but no one seemed to take them seriously.

Apparently the Nor

wegians could not comprehend the idea that a German attack might be
directed against them.

On April £, a film was shown at the German

legation In Oslo to several members of the Norwegian government and
other distinguished guests.

They were treated to a vivid pictorial

review of the Polish campaign and the bombing of Warsaw with the caption,
“For this they could thank their English and French friends."^®

Evi

dently the film was intended as a warning to the Scandinavian nations,
for it was presented the same evening at the legations in Stockholm and
Copenhagen.
On April 7, the various units of the German fleet which were to
take part in the invasion embarked from their respective ports.

JJy the

morning of April 8, a great amount of shipping activity had been sighted
in the Kattegat and German naval forces were reported steaming north
ward.

A German troop transport was sighted by the Pbllsh submarine,

Orzel. in the Skaggerak and was torpedoed and sunk.

The German troops

who abandoned the ship were rescued by a Norwegian destroyer and gave
21
the story that they were on their way to "protect Bergen."
Also on
April 8, the British destroyer Glowworm was sunk when it accidentally

^D o nald M acIntyre, N arvik (New Torks W0 W0 Norton and C o., In c . ,
1959 ), p . 30.
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ran into a group of German warships bound for Norway,
By now, it should have been evident that an Invasion was in
progress, but reactions on the part of both the British and Norwegian
governments were extremely slow.

Troops were not mobilized and no ad

vance warnings were given to the various commanders of Norwegian ships
and coastal installations.
At kth$ A.M. on April 9, the German minister in Oslo, Dr. Braeuer,
called on the Norwegian foreign minister, Dr. Koht, with a memorandum
containing a long list of German demands.

The note stated that the

German government had acted solely to "protect"1 the Kingdom of Norway
from an impending invasion by English and French troops, and thus was
acting in the "interests of Norway" by forestalling this Allied attack.

22

Germany would naturally expect the Norwegians to offer no resistance and
to cooperate with the German authorities in taking over the territory
and military installations of the country.
in Denmark.

The same demands were made

The Danes, quickly overwhelmed by superior forces, had no

choice but to capitulate.

In Norway, German forces successfully seized

the major seaports, including Oslo, but the Norwegian government was
determined to resist the German ultimatum and issued orders for a gen
eral mobilization.
On the same day, the German minister in Stockholm, Prinz zu Wied,
called upon Foreign Minister Guenther and handed him the following notes
She German Government expects Sweden to observe the strictest
neutralitys to refrain from any kind of measures directed

220* j 0 Hambro, I Saw I t Happen in Norway (New Yorki D. AppletonGentury C o., 1941), pp. 2Q3-20ir,

against the German occupation of Denmark and Norway, particu
larly military mobilization and the deployment of troops.23
The German note also stressed the importance of the maintenance of Swed
ish ore deliveries and requested the free and unhampered use of lines
of communication through Sweden.

Swedish warships should "in their own

interests" stay within the three-mile limit for the present.

2k

The

Swedes were assured that their territorial integrity would in no way
be impaired by the action against Norway and Denmark.
The Swedish cabinet immediately met to consider the German re
quests and to determine the course which Swedish policy should take.
Late In the afternoon of April 9, Guenther again received the German
minister and transmitted to him the following reply?
The Swedish Government intends to maintain the policy of
neutrality which it has already declared several times during
the present war. It must retain complete freedom to take all
such precautions as may be considered necessary for the preser
vation and defense of this neutrality.2^
The Swedes did not, however, intend to take any action which might lead
to conflict between Germany and Sweden, and would attempt to conform to
the measures requested in the German memorandum.
The direction which Swedish policy took was dictated by the cir
cumstances of the Norwegian invasion, not out of any particular sympathy
for the German action.

Daring the Russo-Firmish War, Sweden had given

considerable assistance to the Finnish forces, but the Norwegian inva
sion was a different situation entirely.

This was part of the general

conflict between Germany and the western powers, and any intervention

23DGFP, IX, 9£,

2^Ibid.
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might be interpreted as an attitude of belligerency on the part of
Sweden.

Although the Swedes had a great desire to help the Norwegian

cause, strict neutrality was the only official course which the government could follow.
However, from the very beginning of the invasion and during the
ensuing fighting in Norway, great pressure was exerted on Sweden by
both sides to grant concessions of an unneutral character.

When the

German forces invaded Norway on April 9, their commanders had orders to
not let King Haakon and the members of the government escape.

On April

12, the king was forced to flee across the border onto Swedish territory
to avoid a German bombing attack.

He returned to Norway half an hour

later, but some of his entourage remained in Sweden.

The foreign min

ister, Br. Koht, stayed for two days and during that time organized the
Norwegian foreign service to meet the new threat.

The Norwegian lega

tion in Stockholm soon became the center of the resistance, where the
attempt was made to coordinate the efforts of the various fighting forces
in Norway.

From the legation, the Norwegian officials in Stockholm could

talk by telephone with the military leaders at home and with the person
nel of the Norwegian legations in other countries who were trying to
maintain contact with the foreign ministry.

26

On May 17, the Swedish

government permitted the Norwegian exiles to hold a special service in
a Stockholm church to celebrate Norway's national day.
In spite of these concessions, there were many Norwegian requests
which the Swedish government refused to consider.

26Hambro, p. 91.

When the Storting

president, G. J. Hambro, wished to broadcast from Stockholm on April 11
in the name of King Haakon, the German government applied pressure on
Sweden to prevent the address from taking place.

Ribbentrop informed

the Swedish minister that Germany desired "a loyal Swedish attitude11
and that the broadcast did not conform to this principle.

27

State

Secretary von Weizsaecker also told the German minister in Stockholm to
"see that a Swedish ban on it should be issued."

28

The German warnings

were sufficient, and at the last minute Hambro was forbidden to speak.
The Swedish government was equally inhospitable to Norwegian
soldiers who were forced to cross the frontier.

Such persons were imme

diately interned by the Swedes, although many were later permitted to
escape to Great Britain.

The government also would not allow the re

cruitment of volunteers to fight for Norway, a distinct departure from
its attitude during the Winter War.
Many Norwegians were particularly embittered by the Swedish atti
tude with regard to supplies which the Norwegian forces desperately
needed.

The Swedish government refused to sell arms or ammunition to

the Norwegian government, nor would it permit the transit of war mater
ials bought in other countries through Sweden to Norway.

A large ship

ment of ammunition from the Unmarken district in northern Norway was
seized by the Swedish authorities when the Norwegian government attempted
to send it through Sweden to the forces fighting near Narvik.

29

Toward Germany, however, Sweden was a great deal more conciliatory.
Shortly after the beginning of the invasion, the Germans complained that

they were being inconvenienced by the black-out of Swedish lighthouses
along the coast.

Pressure from the foreign office was applied and the

Swedish government promptly ordered the lights reilluminated.
On April 19, King Gustav V wrote personally to Hitler* assuring
30
him of Sweden's neutral intentions.
The Fuehrer's response was quite
cordial} he informed the Swedish king that the invasion of Norway had
been forced upon him by the actions of Britain and France in attempting
to halt Germany1s supplies of Swedish ore, but that he had no intention
of extending the conflict to the rest of Scandinavia.

A political and

economic reorganization of the Baltic area, favorable to both sides,
might soon become the subject of a new settlement between Germany and
Sweden. ^

Both King Gustav and Foreign Minister Guenther were reported

extremely pleased with Hitler's reply.
She Fuehrer had reason to woo the leaders of the Swedish govern
ment, for important economic and political discussions were now in pro
gress between the two countries, the results of which were largely
dependent on Swedish good will and cooperation.

On April 12, the Swed

ish prime minister, Per Albln Hansson, broadcast an address in which he
stated*
It is not consistent with strict neutrality to permit any
belligerent to make use of Swedish territory for its activity.
Fortunately no demands in such a direction have been made of us.
Should any such demands be made they must be r e f u s e d . 32
Hansson's speech, however, was not strictly in accordance with the facts.
On April 11, General Haider, the Chief of Staff of the German army,

3°DGFP. IX, 208-209.
32ibid.. IX, 11*2.

31ibid.. IX, 228-229.

noted In his diary that Germany had “made an official request to Sweden
for permission to use the Swedish railroads in connection with our oc33
cupation operation."
The German government wished to arrange the transport across
Sweden of war materials for the troops in Narvik and Trondheim, and
also hoped to secure permission for the transit to Narvik of certain
non-military goods including food, clothing, medical supplies, and med
ical personnel.

After some consideration, the Swedish government re

fused to permit the shipment of war material or troops since this would
constitute an unneutral act on the part of Sweden.
requests received more sympathetic attention.

However, the other

The eabinet agreed on

April 17 to permit the transit of non-military supplies and medical
personnel, but emphasized that the concession "should be regarded as
an individual case."

3k

On April 18, the German government requested permission for the
transit to Germany from Narvik of about six hundred merchant seamen who
had been stranded there by the invasion.

This also was approved by the

Swedish government, and the men were transported across Sweden between
April 21 and April 23.

According to a memorandum by Brunhoff, an offi

cial In the German foreign ministry, certain naval personnel were among
the "merchant" seamen included in the transit.

35

Meanwhile the train with non-military supplies had left for Narvik

33pVanz Haider, The Private War Journal of Generaloberst Franz
Balder: lU August 1939 to 2k September 19ii2 (on deposit at the University
of Montana Library), III, 159.
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April 20 carrying "medical stores, forty members of the medical corps,

and rations for the troops stationed in and around N a r v i k . A t the
same time, Guenther warned the German government that such shipments
could not be considered a routine concession by Sweden and he admitted
that he was rather disturbed by the amount of goods that the Germans
were sending.

However, on April 28, the Swedish government received

and approved a German request for the transit of wounded and disabled
troops from Narvik to Germany.
While these negotiations were going on, general economic discus
sions were also in progress between Germany and Sweden.

The Swedes

wanted increased coal deliveries from Germany, and permission for the
safe conduct through German controlled waters of a certain number of
Swedish merchant ships which were currently in English ports.

The

Swedish government particularly desired the prompt delivery of some
armaments which had been ordered in Germany and were now long overdue,
and it was this last request which the German negotiators seized upon
as a bargaining point.
On the suggestion of the legation in Stockholm, Ribbentrop agreed
to permit the shipment of additional military supplies to Sweden, pro
vided the Swedish government would in turn consent to the shipment
through Sweden of German armaments and ammunition bound for Narvik and
Trondheim.

Sweden had already refused such a request, but it was hoped

she might reconsider her position.

To facilitate an agreement, Ribben

trop sent a note to the German representatives listing the deliveries

36I b i d , . IX , 221.

he would permit if Sweden complied with the German requests.

In that

eventuality, Germany would supply Sweden with?
(1) 2850 machine guns with 38 million rounds of ammunition
— l50© in May and the rest in June;
(2) 2ii,000 rounds of howitzer ammunition, immediately!
(3) 30 two-centimeter naval antiaircraft guns with ammuni
tion,' immediately!
(ij.) 200 three-centimeter and seven-centimeter antitank guns
with 500 rounds of ammunition each . .
(5) 1000 pistols in Junei
(6) the possibility of supplying further two-centimeter
antiaircraft guns and 100,000 rifle barrels. . .
There were also several proposals designed to overcome Swedish
objections to aims transit on the grounds of neutrality.

Extra-large

artillery would not be transported and the shipments would be made to
appear as Inconspicuous as possible.

Ribbentrop suggested that Germany

would?
Be prepared formally to sell to Sweden the arms the transit of
which we desire together with the arms that are to be delivered
to Sweden, on condition that Sweden will immediately sell them
back to us, and undertake to deliver than to a place to be
designated by us.’°
He added, however, that this would not be considered until he learned
the result of the present negotiations.
On May 7, a meeting was held at the Swedish foreign ministry
between members of the Swedish government and representatives of Germany.
The Swedish Secretary General Boheman informed the German minister that
Sweden had never allowed the transit of arms through Swedish territory
except in the case of the Russo-Finnish War, in which the Swedish atti
tude was not one of absolute neutrality.

In this war, however, Swedish

policy was clearly defined and any concessions of this nature to Germany
would be a breach of neutrality.

The Swedish government, therefore, did

not wish to consider the matter further.

The train of non-military

supplies sent to Narvik had been a special case and did not create a
precedent, although Boheman added that “there was nothing to prevent
the sending of single carloads and of individual freight shipments in
normal International railway traffic.
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Following the breakdown of the negotiations, Germany placed an
embargo on the delivery of arms shipments to Sweden.

Even material

which had been promised to Sweden earlier was to be withheld as an at
tempted means of coercion.
In the middle of May, the German government tried to re-open
talks on the transit question.

On May 16, the Swedish minister in

Berlin, Richert, had an interview with Ribbentrop and the following day
he discussed with von Weizsaecker the new German requests.

The Germans

wanted permission to send three special trains to Narvik which would
carry supplies of ammunition, guns, and other military equipment.

A

request was also made for the crews of German destroyers which had been
sunk near Narvik to be sent back to Germany through Sweden.
immediately flew to Stockholm with the German requests.

Richert

The Swedish

government agreed to the transit of approximately 2000 men from the
destroyer crews, but again refused to permit the delivery of arms
through Swedish territory.

This time the argument was not only neutral

ity, but the fact that such action would endanger Sweden's good rela
tions with the Norwegian people.

39l b i d . . IX , 292.

The Swedish government had previously

denied a Norwegian request for the delivery of war material and did not
feel that, under the circumstances, it would be possible to grant a
concession of this nature to Germany.

liO

Guenther also objected to the

unusually large number of medical personnel (nearly 300 men) who had
been sent through Sweden under the existing arrangements*
Aside from the transit question, the German government held dis
cussions on other matters with Sweden during the period of fighting in
Norway.

At the beginning of June, the Swedish navy agreed to cooperate

in laying submarine nets across the Sound, even including the area within
Swedish territorial waters.

The nets were laid on June h by German

naval personnel dressed in civilian clothes and using German equipment.

liX

At this time, German attention was centered on Narvik, which had
been recaptured by Allied forces on May 28,

The object of the Allied

operations was not only to regain Norway, but according to General Ismays
to capture the town and obtain possession of the railway to the
Swedish frontier. We should then be in a position to put a
force, if necessary, into the Gallivare ore-fields, the posses
sion of which is the main objective of the whole of the opera
tions in Scandinavia,h2
The area near Trondheim, in central Norway, was alsq the scene of Allied
landings.
The initial impact of these operations was recorded on the German
side by Vice Admiral Friedrich luge.

He stated that Hitler "took a very

pessimistic view of the situation and actually ordered General Bietl to
allow his troops to be interned in Sweden."^3

The decision was not

^ Ibld., IX, 502.
k°Ibid.. IX, 369
h2„.
Churchill, Gathering Storm, pp. 632-633^

Vice Admiral Friedrich Huge, Sea Warfare.
Cassell and Co., Ltd., 1959), p- 73-

(Londons

handed down, however, because of the action of a ©olonel on the OKW
Staff who stopped the transmission of the radio message.
The Swedish government was also apprehensive about the prospect
of a British occupation of northern Norway.

Following the German in

vasion on April 9, Swedish troops had been mobilized and extra forces
stationed in the northern region to prevent any
ore-fields by either side.

encroachment on the

In the middle of Hay, when a Norwegian

collapse seemed imminent, representatives of the Norwegian and Swedish
governments met in Stockholm and formulated a proposal whereby an arm
istice would be declared in northern Norway, to be followed by the
evacuation of the troops of both belligerents and the occupation of
the area by Swedish forces,

The Norwegian government was at first

hopeful that a British success would prevent the necessity of such an
action, but it soon became evident that the situation in France might
necessitate the evacuation of the British troops in Narvik,

Daring

the first days of June, the matter was broached several times to var
ious German officials as well as to representatives of Great Britain,
but Germany was non-committal.

On June 3» the foreign ministers of

Norway and Sweden met at Lulea and drew up in detail a definite pro
posal regarding an armistice agreement.

However, by this time it was

obvious to the Germans as well that the British could not hold on in
Narvik much longer.

When the Swedish minister explained the armistice

plan to von Weizsaecker, the state secretary was dubious about the
possibility of its acceptance.

He referred the idea to Ribbentrop,

who decided to treat the matter “d i l a t o r i l y . T h e British forces

kl
finally evacuated Narvik on June 8, and the remaining Norwegian troops
capitulated on June 10.
With the conclusion of hostilities, Germany emerged as the dom
inant power in Scandinavia.

Hitler“s objectives of maintaining control

over the Swedish ore supplies as well as over the sea route to Germany
had been achieved.

The Allies were now on the defensive in Prance,

and it was unlikely that any large-scale attack would be mounted in
the near future against the German positions in Norway.

Although Sweden

remained unoccupied and technically free, she remained cut off from the
West by German-dominated territory.

Sweden was now dependent on Germany

for her necessary imports, and she therefore was not in a position to
resist any outstanding German demands.

For approximately the next three

years, until Allied advances in 19k3 foreshadowed Germany’s eventual
defeat, Hitler took advantage of his position, forcing the Swedes to
grant concessions which, in effect, were a departure from their policy
of neutrality and made Sweden an unwilling accomplice in the German
plan of conquest.

t

CHAPTER III
THE IRA OF CONCESSIONS

With the conclusion of hostilities In Norway, Germany was In a
position to apply pressure upon the Swedish government to grant conces
sions of a distinctly unneutral character.

On June 13, 19U0, only three

days after the Norwegian surrender, the Chief of the High Command of the
Wehrmacht, General Keitel, seat a communique to Ribbontrop requesting
the foreign minister to reopen negotiations on the subject of further
transit concessions through Swedish territory.

The note pointed out

thats
The collapse of the Norwegian resistance removes, in the opinion
of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, any pretext which the
Swedes have advanced up to the present against the German demands.
On the other hand our need to send transports still remains, since
the air route only allows the sending of small loads, and is be
sides, like the sea route, exposed to enemy countermeasures.
On June 15, the Swedish minister in Berlin, Rlehert, was presented
with a list of specific requests which had been drawn up by Keitel and
included in the note to the German foreign minister.

Sweden“s consent

was sought for the transit of supplies, including arms and ammunition,
through Swedish territory to various German-held bases in Norway.

Transit

of goods to Narvik was held especially vital, owing to the isolated, but
strategic location of the area, but shipment of material to Trondheim
and Oslo was also desired.

In addition, the Germans wanted Sweden to

grant permission for members of the Wehrmacht to travel through Sweden

1DGFP„ IX , 563.

k9
while "on duty and on leave journeys."

2

Keitel reasoned that the Nor

wegian capitulation had changed the situation for Sweden, altering her
need to adhere to a fairly strict conduct of neutrality, and Ribbentrop
tried to Impress this view on the Swedish minister.
Richert flew to Stockholm on June 1? to present the German re
quests to the Swedish government, and on June 19 he returned to Berlin
with the reply which Keitel had anticipated.

The Swedish government

was anxious to assure Ribbentrop that it would not oppose the shipment
of war material through Sweden.
In this connection It was pointed out that, in accordance with
the regulations in Sweden concerning the transit of war equip
ment, special permission was required each time. This did not
mean, however, that a special investigation would also take
placej it was more a matter of formality to see that previous
notification had each time been given in order to ensure immed
iate transport for the war material.3
The Swedish government was also prepared to consent to the request for
the transit of military personnel between Germany and various bases In
Norway.^

2Ibid.. IX, 596.

3Ibid.. IX, 619.

^The decision of the Swedish government to permit the transit of
troops and war materials through its territory marked a definite depart
ure from the policy of neutrality. The regulations concerning such
practices were laid down by the Hague Convention of 1907 as followss
"Convention (V) Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers
and Persons in Case of War on Land," given in Briggs, The Law of Nations.
pp. 1033-103ii •
"Article 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys
of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral
Power.
"Article 5. A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts re
ferred to in articles 2 to h to occur on its territory.
"Article 11. A neutral Power which receives on its territory
troops belonging to the belligerent armies shall intern them, as far as
possible, at a distance from the theatre of war."
The Swedish government now seemed virtually prepared to abandon

Between June 19 and July 8, the details of the proposed transit
agreements were settled through the exchange of notes and meetings be
tween representatives of the two governments involved.

During the

progress of the negotiations, 150 troops on leave were transported
weekly between Narvik and Germany, and two special trains weekly also
transported troops between Kornsjo, a Norwegian border station south
east of Oslo, and Germany.^
On July 8, 19^0, the transit agreement was signed.

Sweden in

large measure acceded to the German demands while attempting to preserve
some vestiges of neutrality to present to the outside world.

The Swed

ish government would permit the shipment of Wehrmacht supplies, includ
ing war material, through Swedish territory from Germany to Norway.

In

accordance with Swedish regulations, the German government would always
notify Sweden in advance when planning a shipment and secure the necessary transit permit.

6

The Swedish government would also allow the

conveyance of troops in uniform across Swedish territory as individual
travelers or in groups, and in the latter case, the Swedish authorities
would be informed ahead of time in order to facilitate preparations for
the journey.

Officers traveling on the trains in special compartments

would be permitted to keep their pistols, but soldiers could have only

its neutrality in contrast to its attitude during the fighting in Nor
way. With some exceptions, the transit of troops allowed at that time
was confined largely to humane purposes in accordance with Article lli
of the Conventions "A neutral Power may authorize the passage over
its territory of the sick and wounded belonging to the belligerent
armies, on condition that the trains bringing them shall carry neither
personnel nor war material."

6

,

Ibid.. X, lli and 158.

their bayonets.

The rest of the arms belonging to the troops, including

7
rifles and pistols, would be transported in separate trains.

Foreign

Minister Guenther was worried about the possibility of British bombing
attacks on the rail lines used for the transit and promised the German
representatives that anti-aircraft defenses along these routes would be
strengthened.
Further details of the transit were arranged by agreement between
the two governments.

One train in each direction would be

provided

for the conveyance of troops on leave between Narvik and Trelleborg,
the port in southern Sweden from which they would sail to Germany. This
number was increased on September lit to provide for ,!two trains weekly
between Narvik and Trelleborg for each 500 men on leave."

8

of trains on this line was later increased to three a week.

The number
Transpor

tation was also to be continued between Kornsjo and Trelleborg with one
train daily in both directions for each 500 men on leave.

This was

amended in September to provide "one train daily between Komsjo and
Trelleborg for each 1000 men on leave."

9

The entire matter of the transit of troops to and from Norway
was approached by Sweden with the assumption that the total number of
German forces in that country would not be Increased by this measure.
No more soldiers were to be permitted to travel to Norway than had
previously returned from there.

Guenther granted the concession for

7Ibid., X, 158,.and Joachim Joesten, "Phases in Swedish Neutral
ity," Foreign Affairs. XXIII (January, 19h$)t 327°
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daily trains on various routes in spite ©f disapproval by the Riksdag
and against his own belief that "daily German military trains on Swedish
soil as a regular institution would . . . be incompatible with his
efforts to maintain at least the outward appearance of neutrality."

10

On this point German pressure triumphed over Guenther*s reluctance.
In addition to the conveyance of troops between Norway and
Germany, there was also what was referred to as the "horseshoe traffic."
Because the rail line between Trondheim, in central Norway, and Narvik
ran through Swedish territory, transportation of members of the Wehr
macht between these two locations was routed through Sweden from
Storlien to Riksgransen in the Narvik area.

This traffic amounted to

two trains weekly in each direction.
The Germans made extensive use of these concessions? by the end
of 19l*0, the number of troops transported was "133,135 from, and 123,105
to Norway," although Ghristmas leave may have accounted for part of this
traffic.

11 A substantial amount of German equipment was also shipped

to Norway during 19i*0j by December "1*50 vans of war material had passed
through Sweden."

12

While the transit discussions were in progress, German and
Swedish representatives were also negotiating agreements concerning
shipping and trade.

A shipping agreement signed on June 20, 19l*0,

10Ibid.. X, 123.
^Arnold and Victoria M. Toynbee (eds.), Survey of International
Affairs, 1939-191*6; The War and the Neutrals (Londons Oxford University
Press, 195>6), p. 186.
12

Ibid.
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provided for the transportation to Sweden of German eoal exports.

The

coal was to be carried on the same Swedish ships which were used to
transport iron ore from Lulei. to German ports.

This arrangement would

free German ships, which would ordinarily carry the coal, for other
uses.

13
Other economic discussions, lasting until July 10, concerned the

clearing arrangements necessary for increased trade between Germany and
Sweden during 191*0.

One facet of the agreement dealt with the expected

increase in value of the exports which Sweden planned to sell to Germany
in 19^0s
The price arrangement, by which the cost of certain goods im
ported from Germany depended on the cost to Germany of Swedish
iron ore was to continue. This arrangement was to apply to
German deliveries of coal and coke, which was thus to benefit
from the rise in prices.^
The Swedish negotiators were anxious to secure a continuing supply of
coal and cokej in the final agreement, Germany promised to send 1*,000,000
15
tons of coal and 1,700,000 tons of coke to Sweden in 191*0.

Germany

would also increase exports to Sweden of machinery and chemicals.

For

her part, Sweden agreed to increase her exports to Germany of ferrosilicate and plg-lron and to supply certain quantities of steel, timber,
pulp, and lead and sine ores.^
In the latter part of June, when both the economic discussions
and transit negotiations were being favorably considered by Sweden, the
question of resuming the shipment of war materials to Sweden was sug
gested by the German foreign office.

The shipments had been suspended

^Medlicott, p. 621.

%bid.
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l6Ibid.. pp. 621-622.

in the beginning of May when Sweden refused to grant extensive conces
sions to Germany.

Now that the Swedish attitude had become more flex

ible, there were solid reasons for relaxing this embargo.

As a

memorandum from the foreign ministry suggested on June 25 2
Entirely apart from the very accomodating attitude which the
Swedish Government showed in the last economic negotiations, a
resumption of our deliveries of war material is essential in
order to finanee the German imports of ore and other urgently
needed raw materials from Sweden.I7
On June 27, the foreign office was informed of the Fuehrer's decision
that the war materials which Germany had withheld oould now be released
for export to Sweden.
On December lit» 19it0, a new economic agreement to regulate /trade
between Germany and Sweden during 19ltl was signed by representatives of
the two governments.

The amounts of German iron, coke and coal, and

Swedish iron ore to be exported were to remain the same as in the prev
ious year, but the price of the German goods would be increased from
fifteen to twenty per cent, while the price of the Swedish ore would
18
not fluctuate from its I9J4O level.
In addition to the trade agreements with Germany, Sweden main
tained her economic relations with the countries of occupied Europe and
with other nations on the continent.

On April 5, 19Ul» Sweden reached

an agreement with the German authorities in Norway in which she promisedto send 10,000 tons of grain to Norway in exchange for imports of fish
and certain metals, including aluminum.

19

Sweden also signed trade

17DGFP. X, 15.
l8Medlicott, p. 622.

19Ibid.. p. 58it.

treaties daring 19l*0 and 19l*l with Denmark, Holland, Belgium and Hungary.
Outside of the German occupied areas, Sweden held trade negotiations with Finland, Turkey, Spain and the Soviet

>

an agreement with the latter provided Sweden with "Russian oil and lowgrade petrol," for which Sweden "in return was to bring similar American

..20
products to Vladivostok."
In spite of her Isolated position, Sweden also maintained limited
trade relations with Great Britain following the Norwegian invasion.
Most of the economic negotiations were carried on through a "Joint
Standing Committee" composed of an equal number of representatives from
Great Britain and Sweden.

The other Allied countries could also be

invited to membership in the committee, as was the United States in
191*2. The-committee handled many details concerning the trade which
continued between Sweden and Great Britain.

A large part of its work

included*
the consideration of individual applications of firms to effect
imports and exports outside the terms of the war-trade agreement,
arid after the introduction of quotas, applications to effect
imports and exports not provided for by the quotas. At times
the assistance of the committee was used to keep Swedish trading
activities under the control of Allied interests.21
The British were primarily concerned that raw materials imported Into
Sweden might later be re-exported to German-controlled areas in their
original form or as manufactured goods, and attempted to bring pressure
upon the Swedish government to discourage firms from engaging in this
practice.
The problem of transportation between Sweden and the West was

2°Ibid.. p. 628.

2^-Ibid.. p. 619.

one of the difficulties faced by the committee.

In the spring of 191*0,

when the German blockade cut off ship traffic to the West, Sweden leased
a large part of her merchant fleet to Great Britain.

During the remain

der of that year, goods from the West reached Sweden via Petsamo and
Vladivostok.

Gn December 9, 191*0, an agreement was signed providing

for a certain amount of ship traffic between Britain and the Swedish
port of Gothenburg.

The Gothenburg agreement stipulated that Hfour

ships would be allowed to pass in and out of the port each month, but no
ship would be permitted to enter without a corresponding ship leaving
port."

22

The ships were to follow specific routes and were not to sub

mit to German contraband controls.
Since the ships would have to pass through German-controlled
waters, it was essential for Sweden to obtain the consent of the German
government.

On February 7 and March £, 191*1, notes were exchanged be

tween Stockholm and Berlin in which the Germans agreed to a certain
amount of traffic between Sweden and the West.

A German control office

was to be established in Gothenburg, with the proviso that all data
concerning the arrival and departure of the ships and the nature of
their cargos would be submitted to the office by the Swedish maritime
authorities.

23

The shipping arrangement worked well until the first of April
when the Germans extended their zone of operations to include the area
around Iceland.

The Germans wanted the Swedish ships to follow a course

midway between Iceland and the Faroes, but the British insisted on

57

passage through the Faroes and Skapen Fjord.

For several months, the

From July k to July 8, German-

Gothenburg traffic was at a standstill.

Swedish negotiations on the subject were held in Berlin.

The German

authorities agreed to allow the continuation of the Gothenburg traffic
and the passage of ships through the Faroes, but warned that?
Within the area that is comprised within a circle with a
radius of 60 nautical miles with its center at Skapen the
traffic goes exclusively at Swedish risk. . . . a guarantee
for a safe trip by the ships through the German zone of
operations cannot be undertaken on the German part.^U
Five Swedish ships now in American ports would make the trip to Gothen
burg via this route.

Sweden agreed not to take cargo aboard or discharge

it near the Faroes, and to limit further trips through the German zone
of operations to no more than "twice a month in each direction."
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Although the Gothenburg traffic primarily benefited Sweden, the
German government had good reasons for permitting it to continue.

In

September, 19i<.l, the German minister in Sweden discussed the value of
the traffic to Germany in terras of Sweden's increased "capacity to make
deliveries to Germany and Finland."
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The Germans also did not wish to

jeopardize their own trade agreements with Sweden by creating incidents
which might result in public pressure on the Swedish government to cur
tail the concessions granted to Germany.

At a Fuehrer conference on

September 17, it was announced that?

21+Xbld.. XIII, 116.

2W

. XIII, 117.

2% b l d .. XIII, 565o Although Sweden had promised Great Britain
that she would not re-export goods to Germany, Minister zu Wied pointed
out that in August, Britain suspended the importation of American truck
parts to Sweden because the Swedes had delivered 500 trucks to Finland.
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Within the entire (extended) blockade areas All merchant vessels
may be attacked without warning, Swedish vessels are excepted,
in accordance with the special arrangement with Sweden*27
During the autumn of 19U0, attention in the North was focused on
a proposed alliance between Sweden and Finland.

Following the conclu

sion of the Winter War between Russia and Finland, and prior to the
Norwegian invasion, a defensive alliance between Norway, Sweden and
Finland had become the subject of discussions among the northern coun
tries, but the idea was shelved when the Soviet 0hion applied pressure
by pointing out that Article Three of the treaty ending the Winter War
expressly stated that Finland should refrain from entering into a
coalition which might be aimed at Russia.
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However, interest in a northern alliance revived in October, 19i*0,
when Sweden initiated talks on the subject with the Finnish government.
On this occasion the Swedes proposed a political as well as military
union with Finland, which would have far-reaching implications for the
northern countries.

The Swedish government stressed that it would not

sanction a war of revenge against Russia and hoped that in this case
Swedish moderation might prevail upon the Soviet Union to soften its
attitude toward a Finnish alliance.

•^Fuehrer Conferences. 191*1, II, 1*1*.
28
Manaerheim, p. 39lu Maimerheim asserts that? "The veto of the
Soviet Union was to prove to be a mistake. As events were to show, the
failure of the alliance to materialize was only to benefit Hitler, whose
attack on Scandinavia consequently did not result in united opposition
from Sweden and Norway. It may be doubted if Hitler would ever have at
tacked Norway if he had known that it would lead to an open conflict
with Sweden and Finland. A defensive alliance would automatically have
carried us over to the camp of Germany's enemies. Tied to the defensive
policy of Sweden and Norway, Finland, though mutilated and weakened,
could have guaranteed the security of Leningrad."

The German government, for its part, determined to treat the
matter with restraint.

On November 7, instructions sent to the lega

tion in Sweden stated that2 “The Foreign Minister requests you to keep
entirely aloof for the time being from all plans for a Finnish-Swedish
rapprochement."
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On December 5? the Swedish explorer and self-styled

diplomat, Sven Hedin, had a meeting with Hitler in Berlin and argued
the merits of the Finnish alliance.

When Hitler remarked that the

peace treaty with Russia precluded such a proposal, Hedin answered that
perhaps a secret understanding between the two countries might be the
answer.

This aroused the Fuehrer to expound on the dangers of such a

course, pointing out that2
Even the most secret agreements always leak out and soon become
common property. . . . Any step in that direction would only
make Russia nervous and Moscow would regard it as a provocation.
. . . I advise Finland to carry out the Moscow Peace down to the
smallest detail and to do nothing that might give rise to fresh
misunderstandings and unpleasantness.3®
The Soviet Union ultimately took the initiative in subverting the
planned alliance.

Twice during the month of December, Molotov met with

the Finnish minister in tbscow and reiterated the Soviet stand against
a northern coalition, declaring that it was contrary to the terras of
the peace treaty.

At the same time, Molotov made certain that the

Swedish government understood plainly his warnings to Finland,

Because

of this Soviet pressure and the lack of encouragement from Germany, the
project was ultimately abandoned.

3°Sven Hedin. German Diary. 193!>-I9k2 (Dublin? Euohorion Books.
1951), P. 180. See a l H T W T H . 78^7857

As Hitler had indicated to Sven Hedin, a difficult situation in
the North, which was bound to arouse Russia's displeasure, was not con
sistent with his own wishes at the moment.

In December, 19h0, he was

engaged in preparing the directives for Operation Barbarossa. the planned
invasion of the Soviet Union, and did not wish to approach the problem
with an irate Molotov breathing down the necks of the Scandinavian
countries.

Hitler had his own plans for Sweden and Finland, whom he

hoped to have as his allies in the approaching conflict with the Soviet
Union.

On December 18, Directive Number 21 for Operation Barbarossa was

issued in which the proposed roles of both countries were defined.

Ac

cording to this pronouncement, Finland would operate jointly with German
troops to be transported from Norway via Swedish roads and railways,
which Hitler hoped would be made available for this purpose.
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In

formulating his plans for Operation Barbarossa. Hitler intended to
utilize Sweden's traditional distrust of the Soviet Union as well as
exploiting Finland's desire to recover her territory lost to the Soviet
Union in the Winter War.
On February 3, at a conference of the German operations staff,
General Haider announced a plan to transport one and a half troop divi
sions from Norway to northern Finland, provided Sweden would cooperate.
Hitler then interjected his assumptions
that Sweden will participate for the price of the cession of the
Aaland Islands. A Swedish-Finnish union will not be considered,
because it does not fit into the new order of Europe.32

3^-Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie (eds.), NaziSoviet Relations. 1939-191*1 (New Yorks Didier, 191*8), p. 261.

61
Daring the first quarter of 191*1, the number of German military
personnel traveling north through Sweden, in accordance with the transit
agreement, rose in proportion to those journeying south.

A move to

strengthen the German garrison in Norway was apparently underway.

t>n

March 1, Guenther protested to Minister zu Wled that “transport of
German troops in a south-north direction was exceeding the permitted
figures."
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On March ll*, in response to a German request, Guenther

agreed to renewed discussions of the transit arrangements.
As part of the attack against the Soviet Union, the Germans
planned to commit two divisions in central Finland.

In a memorandum

of March 19, the German envoy in charge of the transit negotiations,
Ambassador litter, stated that3
The two divisions are tobe brought through Sweden by rail
to Finland tothe area north of the Gulf of Bothnia.
They are
to join one or two Finnish divisions there. . . .
As camouflage Sweden is to be told that the mountain divisions
now in northern Norway are to be later relieved by ship since
they are needed elsewhere. In their place two Infantry divisions
are, as stated above, to be' transported through Sweden by rail,
with the decision to be reserved for later on whether the remain
ing distance through Finland to northern Norway will be covered
by automobile transport via the Arctic Highway or whether part
of it will goto Narvik via Swedish railway.3a
Negotiations would begin immediately in Stockholm under the direction of
Minister Schnurre, who had been Instrumental in securing the original
transit concessions.
On March 21, the German legation in Stockholm reported that
Guenther had declined permission for a large German replacement force
to travel via Swedish railways, but had suggested instead that the

33ibid.. XII, 320n.

%£!£•» m » 320.
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troops be transported through Swedish territorial waters*

Guenther in

sisted that Sweden did not feel threatened by the German reinforcements.
"What was important for Sweden, however, was the equality of the railway
transports in each direction." ^ A one-sided transport such as the
Germans were requesting would be Incompatible with the terms of the
transit agreement.

In his decision, Guenther was undoubtedly reacting

to criticisms of the government's policy which had recently appeared in
the Swedish press.

After March 23, the amount of German rail traffic

going to Norway through Sweden decreased to a rate more in accordance
with the provisions of the transit treaty.
In April, various German officials sought to probe the possibility
of active Swedish participation in case of a renewal of the FinnishHussian dispute.

On April 23, the German military attache talked with

Colonel Kellgrem, who was head of the Swedish office for liason with
foreign military attaches.

Kellgren "assured him that in case of a re

newed Russian attack on Finland, Sweden would give active aid to Finland."
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The situation would be more difficult in case of a conflict

between Germany and Russia, although Swedish military leaders were tak- ;
ing the possibility into consideration.

The Swedish government was

displaying a more cautious attitude than the military planners.

The

military attache's report was studied carefully by State Secretary von
Weizsaecker, who agreed that Sweden's intervention would be more likely
if Finland were attacked first by Russian forces.

As Weizsaecker anal

yzed the situation®

3£lbid.. XII, 322.

36Ibldat m

, 620
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As long as Swedish policy believes that we are confronting it
with the choice between Berlin and London It will have great
difficulties in domestic politics® . . .
However, if we confront Sweden with the choice between Berlin
and Moscow then the Swedish decision is clear® It would therefore
probably be easier and more successful to institute conversations
with Sweden in the military sector than in the general political
sector.37
On April 25, Bluecher, the German minister in Finland, reported
that Foreign Minister Guenther was coming to Helsinki for talks with
Finnish officials.

It was believed that Guenther would try to discourage

Finland from allying militarily with Germany and that Sweden would not
actively support Finland unless the Finns were attacked first by the
Soviet Union.
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Between April and June, the Germans continued their approaches
to Sweden, attempting to win concessions which would facilitate the
forthcoming invasion.

The extent of their success may be judged by the

text of the Directive issued on June 17 by the High Command of the
Wehrmacht concerning expected Swedish assistance in Operation Barbarossa.
Swedish military forces would not participate in the invasion, but far39
reaching concessions were anticipated.
The Directive assumed that
Sweden would permit one division of German troops to journey across her
territory to the Finnish front, as well as allowing the continuation of
the transit between Trondheim and Narvik.

Sweden would also furnish

"motorized transportation" and safe passage through her territorial
waters for supplies enroute to Finland.

The Germans planned to send

transport experts to Sweden at the beginning of hostilities to coordinate

37Ibid., XII, 629.
39

38Ibid.. XII, 633.

The text of the Directive is given ins

DGFP. XII, 10l*l~l©ii2.
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the various German and Swedish transport activities. The Directive
also stated that Sweden would allow German use of her "communications
network."

transit flights over Swedish territory by German airplanes

would be permitted and Sweden would make available facilities for emer
gency landings.
The Directive also discussed "questions of armaments and supply."
It was expected that Sweden would allow the purchase of motor vehicles
by Germany and Finland, and would furnish other supplies, ranging from
arms and ammunition to non-military goods, such as foodstuffs.

Sweden

was expected to furnish the Wehrmacht with a "tank depot" in the north
ern part of the country.
The German military leaders assumed that Sweden would mobilize
troops at the beginning of the invasion, but hoped that these measures
would not impede the progress of German troops in transit.

The Germans

would expect the Swedish forces to afford protection for the German
transports while they were crossing Swedish territory.

The Swedish

navy would cooperate in laying mine barriers and in defending the
Swedish coastline from attack.

Sweden would make weather reports

available to German authorities, but would withhold them from the
Soviet Union.

Beacon lights along the coast would be turned on to aid

navigation, and lights would also be provided for purposes of aerial
navigation.

Airplanes and crews which had been forced down on Swedish

territory would not be internedj instead Sweden would assist German
efforts to repair and salvage the planes.
These, then, were Germany's expectations when on June 22, forces
of the Wehrmacht crossed the border into the Soviet Union.

On the same

day the Germans presented Foreign Minister Guenther with a list of mili
tary requests which he promised to bring immediately to the government's
attention.

The primary item, which was jointly requested by Finland,

concerned the transfer of one fully-armed German division from Oslo
across Sweden to Finland.

Guenther, with the active support of King

Gustav V and Prime Minister Hansson, attempted to persuade the rest of
the Swedish government to grant the German wishes.

The Swedish cabinet

was divided on the issue and a political crisis was narrowly averted
when the king threatened to abdicate if a favorable decision was not
)A
reached.
On June 25, Minister zu Wied was informed by the king that
the transit of a single division would be permitted.

It was emphasized,

however, that this was to be a one-time concession and would not be re
peated.

The same afternoon the train carrying the Engelbrecht Division

left Oslo and on June 26, crossed the Swedish frontier.
While these negotiations between Germany and Sweden were in pro
gress, Finland was being subjected to repeated Soviet provocations.

On

June 26, Russian planes bombed Finnish ports and airbuses and the Finns
once again declared war on the Soviet Union.
The entry of Finland into the conflict was used by Sweden to
justify the transit concession granted to Germany.

On June 26, a report

appearing in The Mew York Times quoted a Swedish government spokesman
as saying that in deciding to allow the transit, the government was
cognizant of the "special relations" between Sweden and Finland.

He

went on to say that in this case, Sweden was more neutral than in the

66

Winter War, bat upon further questioning admitted that the Swedish con
cession constituted “a slight deviation from ne u t r a l i t y , , T h e
spokesman denied that Germany had requested bases in Sweden or the
cooperation of the Swedish navy*
In spite of Swedish attempts to minimize the extent of the as
sistance provided to the German-Finnish forces in the ensuing conflict,
German documents provide a slightly different view of the situation,,
On June 27, the legation in Sweden reported thatg
The movement of supplies to Finland on every technically
practical scale has been approved by the Swedish government.
. . . Preparations are now being hastened to organize a route
to Finland over Swedish railroads to the Swedish ports of Gavle
and Sundsvall on the Gulf of Bothnia.^2
From there the goods would be transported by

sea to Finnishports.

Toward the end of June, agreements were concluded in which both
the Swedish air force and navy granted certain concessions to the German
counterparts.

The Swedish navy agreed to mine the passage west of the

Aaland Islands, which in turn would be connected on the west to the
German mine field at 01and0 This was done on June 28, effectively
closing the passage to Russian shipping.

The Swedish navy also promised

to provide convoy service, beginning on June
ing In Swedish territorial waters.

30, for

Sweden would

ships to enter her territorial waters.

not

Germanships sail
allow Russianwar

The provisions of International

law were deliberately cast aside when Sweden agreed that German naval
forces would not be interned if “they exceed the period of stay in

k^The Hew York Times. June 26, 19ltl, p- 5.

k2DGFP« XIII, 30.
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Swedish territorial waters permitted by international law.11

An agreement between the Luftwaffe and the Swedish air force set
up the procedures to be followed in case German planes had to make
forced landings on Swedish territory.

Certain airfields were to be

used by the Germans for this purpose, and maps of the designated land
ing strips would be sent to Luftwaffe headquarters.

The Swedish author

ities would provide fuel and emergency repairs, and pilots forced to
land would not be interned.

Permission was also granted for German

courier aircraft to fly over Swedish territory.

The planes would be

considered civilian aircraft and would fly identifying pennants.

The

flights were to be announced at least two hours in advance so the
Swedish air force could be notified and the planes must follow previ
ously designated routes.

Two routes were established between Norway,

Finland and Germany and the flight schedule called for? “one plane over
each route and in each direction, or two planes on one route in each
Mi
direction, daily. “

Swedish consent must be obtained in case a German

air unit should be transferred to Finland over Swedish territory and
intermediate landing fields established for this purpose.

The Swedes

also agreed not to broadcast weather reports which might benefit the
Russian forces.

If the Germans needed detailed reports, they would be

sent via the closed circuit communications at the legation in Stockholm.
On September 15, an additional agreement concerning courier
flights established two routes between Norway and Finland and two between

!i3
Ibid., XIII, £0.

For the complete naval agreement, see pp. ii8-

50.
^ Ibid.. XIII, 1*6.
pp. It5-^8.

The entire text of the agreement is given on
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Germany and Finland.

Other points of settlement included technical

details of communications, advance notice of flights, overnight stops
and night flights.

It was emphasized that the planes were to be un-

armed and flown by civilian crews.
Although Sweden's policy in this phase of the war displayed a
considerable acquiescence to German demands, the Swedish government
persistently attempted to maintain its freedom of action.

The transfer

of the Engelbrecht division across Sweden had been granted primarily
because Finland as well as Germany had requested it, but the Swedes
refused to allow the transit of military personnel on leave from Fin
land.

The permission for courier flights over Swedish territory was

also granted to the Allies, although it was used less extensively by
the western powers owing to the geographical limitations.

Humanitarian

aid was once again sent to Finland, but no volunteer organizations were
officially sanctioned, as in the Winter War, to fight for the Finnish
cause.

Only a few individual Swedish volunteers crossed the border to

join the Finns.

Since in this instance, Finland's war had become part

of the general European conflagration, the Swedes wished to avoid giv
ing the impression that they were unneutral in the conflict.

In a

speech on July 27, 19itl, Per Edvin Skold, the Swedish minister of de
fense, explained his country's position.
Our line is to try to keep out of the war and we will stick
to this course with iron determination. It cannot be said that
if Sweden grants one belligerent power certain privileges, we
therby have given up our national independence. These conces
sions do not affect our sovereignty, and that is where we draw
the line.k°

^ I b i d .. XIII, 508-509.
^Joesten, Stalwart Sweden, p. 17U*
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In Hitler's ideological schemes, he had visions of Sweden as a
northern partner in the new order which he dreamed of establishing in
Europe.

In a Fuehrer conference on September 6, 19l*0» speaking specif

ically of Sweden and Finland, he had defined this union as a one In
which?
the Individual members have a certain sovereignty (diplomatic
representation, etc.) and have armed forces trained and equipped
by them but organized on the pattern of the German Armed Forces.
Otherwise, however, they should be both politically and econom
ically closely connected with Germany.h7
Simultaneously, the German leaders were always quick to emphasize that
any arrangements of this nature would not interfere with the customs or
national freedom of the Swedish people.

Speaking to Sven Hedin at a

dinner party in October, 191*0, the German state secretary, von Weiz
saecker, explained that the new order would be concerned primarily with
an economic reorganization which would see the elimination of customs
barriers and might be termed a "continuation and consummation of
JR
Napoleon's Continental System."
He also assured Hedin that no com
pulsion would be exerted on Sweden, and the alliance would not inter
fere in any way with Sweden's independence.
The Swedes, however, did not prove responsive to such proposals.
For a time the Germans hoped to draw Sweden into the realm of the Tripartite Pact, but the Swedish government appeared to veto this idea.

ii9

A suggestion by the German minister in Stockholm that a bilateral pact

^ Fuehrer Conferences. 191*0, Vol. II, p. 21.
Hedin, p. 139.

^Haider, IV, 229, and VI, 216 and 272; DGFP. XIII, 93-91*.

between Germany and Sweden might be approved by the Swedes met with a
flat rejection by Ribbentrop.^
The beginning of Jmly, 191*1, saw the resumption of economic dis
cussions between Sweden and Germany.

On July 2, the German minister

was handed a list of military equipment desired by the Swedish govern
ment.

The memorandum was forwarded to Berlin to be considered by the

proper economic and military officials.

On July 10, the Economic Policy

Department reported that an OKW negotiator would bring the German answer
to Stockholm that week.
The Germans refused to grant licenses for airplane engines or
delivery of some aircraft ordered by Sweden, although they did agree to
release aircraft motors captured from French stocks.

The Swedes had

requested the delivery of tanks from Germany in exchange for spare parts
for tanks, but the German reply was largely negative.

The Germans made

several small concessions, but the general tone of the response evidenced an unwillingness to meet the Swedish requests.
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This occasioned

a complaint from the legation in Sweden, in which Schnurre, the princi
pal economic negotiator, stated that he had been forced to call off
economic discussions temporarily because the OKW "does not wish to make
52
any concessions at all without new massive Swedish counterservices.11
The negotiations for a new Swedish-German trade agreement for
19l*2 were scheduled to begin in Berlin in October, and German economic

DGFP. XIII, 96.

^Ib i d ., XIII. The Swedish requests are given on pp. 68-69, and
the German response on pp. 118-119.

experts met on August 28 to discuss the prospects of a Swedish agree
ment.

Germany faced the problem of a clearing deficit brought about by

the low volume of German exports to Sweden in comparison to the amount
that Sweden exported to Germany, and a clearing credit would have to be
obtained from the Swedish government,

the German economists emphasized

that the lack of German exports was reflected by fewer Swedish exports
vital to the war effort; this was particularly noticeable in the lumber
and steel industries and in the production of vessels ordered by Germany
from Swedish shipyards.

To alleviate the situation, a special priority

would be placed on German exports destined for Sweden.

The question of

war material deliveries would be re-examinedg
in the light of the known list of items that the Swedes want,
and particularly from the view-point of how far we might still
be able to go in offering captured material.£3
The problem with captured material lay in delivering it to Sweden, but
it was suggested that the Swedes might agree to transport it themselves.
Preparations for the economic negotiations continued through
*

September.

The legation in Sweden reported that the Swedes appeared

willing to extend credit "to cover existing and anticipated clearing
deficits," and might facilitate matters by "advance payments on future
ex.
German deliveries."
The amount of credit promised actually fell short
of German requirements, but the economic advisors were optimistic that
a better arrangement could be obtained.

The legation advised setting

up a regular sub-committee to handle war-eeomomy orders since the
current situations
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gets the Swedes into the habit of saying no to irregular requests
and by bringing private Swedish firms into the picture makes it
possible for the enemy intelligence service to find out where
German shortages exist.55
The sub-committee should include among its membership one individual who
was familiar with the present trade policy, and another from the OKW to
represent military interests.
While the economists attempted to obtain a favorable settlement
from the Swedish government, the military and political experts were
also engaged in negotiations to further their particular aims.

On July

.31, the German envoy Sehnurre and the Finnish minister in Sweden met
separately with Foreign Minister Guenther and requested the transit of
another German troop division through Sweden,

The following day, Guen

ther informed them that the cabinet had refused to permit the overland
transport of troops, but recommended instead that the division be shipped
to Finland via Swedish territorial waters.

The Swedes pointed out that

*' •/

this route had already been used by the Germans $ for example, in the
previous three days six German troop carriers had sailed through Swedish
waters.

This eoastal traffic was under the protective escort of the

Swedish navy, and with such transport available the Swedes saw no reason
to allow the use of the land route.

<6

On August 1*, Ribbentrop informed

the legation that the OKW found this acceptable, and in September, a
convoy carrying the German division passed through Swedish territorial
waters.
The Swedish government continued to disallow troop transports to
Finland, but on August 5, Sehnurre reported that Guenther would expand

^Ibid,. H U , #*7-51*8.

libido. XIII, 273.
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the application of the original transit agreement signed on July 8, 19i*0,
to include the "unrestricted transport of materials over Swedish railroads to Haparanda," a border town between Sweden and Finland.
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The furlough traffic between Germany and Norway and the shipment
of supplies on Swedish railroads continued in spite of several incidents
which evoked protests from the Swedish government.

On July 19, 191*1, a

German airmunition train loaded with artillery shells exploded at the
station in Krylbo, injuring several persons.

On August 6, a captured

British air force officer was discovered by Swedish authorities on one
of the furlough trains from Norway.

The Swedes, however, did not re

lease the officer, but permitted him to continue to Germany, meanwhile
making known*
their earnest wish that on the German side care be taken lest
the captured English officer communicate to England the fact of
his transportation over Swedish territory in a German furlough
train by letter or any other means at his next opportunity.5°
The German military leaders also wished to obtain supplies in
Sweden for the German divisions in Finland.

On September 22, Fuehrer

Directive Number 36 concerning the conduct of the war in northern Fin
land emphasized that trucks would be "bought or hired in Sweden in order
to shift the supply route of the Mountain Corps to the Arctic Highway."
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The other urgent need was for tents and stoves for use in sub-zero
weather.

On October 23, the legation reported that the Swedish array-

had agreed to release 2000 tents equipped with stoves to be delivered

5?Ibid.. XIII, 283.

58Ibld.. XIII, 287.

R. Trevor-Roper (ed.), Blitzkrieg to Defeat* Hitlerts War
Directives. 1939-191*5 (New Yorks Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 19^1*), p. 100.
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in three days at the Finnish border.
obtain.

The tracks were mere difficult to

It was first reported that Sweden would be willing to lease

over 1000 trucks, but without tires.

The Swedes finally agreed to lease

300 trucks, equipped with tires, with the provision that Germany would
deliver fifty tons of buna, or artificial rubber, to Sweden 11to compensate for the wear on the tires."
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On the first trip, the trucks would

be used to transport a shipment of wooden barracks to Finland and re
turn to Sweden with a load of nickel ore from Petsamo.
On November 20, Minister zu Wied complained to Guenther about
Sweden’s refusal to furnish wool or leather goods needed for winter
fighting in Finland.

Guenther explained that since many of the raw

materials came from Great Britain, such products could not be re-exported
for fear the British would halt the Gothenburg traffic.

Guenther pointed

out, in this connection, that the fuel imported via the Gothenburg route
"was eking out the supplies of the Swedish navy, which, since the out
break of the German-Soviet war, was rendering continual convoy service
for German troops and goods.”

Therefore, it was also in Germany’s

interest to see that the British were not unduly antagonized.
ber 7, Great Britain declared war on Finland.

On Secern-

This action (Ed not

change Sweden's attitude toward the Finns, but they were now forced to
be more cautious about supplying Finland with materials originating in
the West.

Zu Wied observed that new Finnish-German requests might meet

with more success if presented by Finnish representatives and through
regular diplomatic channels.

6oDGFP. X III, 67$.

As he pointed outs
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It is quite obvious and natural that the alarm button will
be pressed as soon as Herr Sehnurre applies at the Swedish
legation in Berlin for a renewed visa and that the “Swedish
hedgehog" . . » will then Immediately roll itself up and pre
sent all its spines.
That Sweden did not always prove amenable to German demands is
illustrated by the case of several Norwegian cargo ships which since
the Norewegian invasion had lain at anchor in the Swedish ports of
Gothenburg and Malmo.

In July, 19i*l, a rumor that the ships planned to

break out and escape to Great Britain prompted the German foreign min
istry to remonstrate with the Swedish government.

A few months previ

ously some of the ships had managed to escape, and the Germans warned
that a repetition of this would result in the cancellation of the
Gothenburg agreement.

The Swedes did not wish to take overt action

against the ship's crews, however, and suggested that the matter might
best be settled through the Swedish courts.

The Swedish government

proposed that the Norwegian shipping firms should send captains to
bring the ships to Norway.

The ships had already been requisitioned

by the Norwegian government-in-exile, so the Norwegian legation would
certainly object to this measure and the case could be brought to court.
If the courts upheld the Norwegian governments
then the shipping firms should propose detention of the ships
on the argument that the right to dispose of the ships was a
matter of dispute and with the aim of getting a judicial deci
sion on the right to dispose of ships.
The ensuing litigation would keep the ships in Gothenburg until the
problem could be settled.

The Germans were not completely satisfied

with this approach, but they were assured by Guenther that the ships

62Ib ld . . X I I I , 977

63Ibid.. m i , 278 .
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would not be allowed to escape.
On September £, ssu Wied visited Guenther and protested that the
judicial procedures were too time-consuming and he feared the "danger
of sabotage.

The Germans could not understand why the Swedes would

not forcibly remove the crews and put new ones on board* although
Guenther explained that he wished to do everything in accordance with
Swedish laws.

On September 11, Guenther reiterated his decision to

settle the issue through the courts.

The judicial procedure was some

what complex and the case of each individual vessel would have to be
decided separately, but once a precedent was set it would not take long
to dispose of the remaining cases.

The shipowners could demand police

protection if they were afraid of sabotage.
At this point the Germans felt they had two alternatives? they
could accept the Swedish view or prepare to let the ships break out and
hope to recapture them at sea.

A decision was imperative because it

was reported that three of the ships had nearly completed preparations
to break out.

On September 17, Guenther informed the German legation

that the Norwegian government~in-extle had chartered the ships to Great
Britain.

It was also rumored that the ships had English captains on

board and that one vessel, the Dieto. was preparing to load a cargo of
war material.

The Germans then demanded that the ships be returned to

the Norwegian shipowners, "immediately and without recourse to judicial
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proceedings.w

Until this occurred, the ships were not t© leave port.

% b id .. X I I I . 1*65.
66Ib ld .. X IH , 522.

6% i d . . X I I I , ii76.

The same ruling applied to Norwegian ships currently under construction
in Swedish shipyards which were to be turned over to the Norwegian firms
upon completion.

Guenther argued that compliance with the German de-

mands would be inconsistent with Swedish neutrality.

He insisted that

if the cases were brought to trial, the ships could be detained by
arrest until a decision was reached.

0n September 19, the legation

reported that the ship-owner had made a motion for the arrest of one
of the ship's captains, and the arrest had taken place within twenty67
four hours.
While these proceedings continued, the Germans lost no oppor
tunity to let the Swedish government know that they considered Sweden's
policy an affront to German interests.

On September 19, Sehnurre lec

tured Guenther for some time on Sweden's "negative attitude" and once
more threatened to cut off the Gothenburg traffic.
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Ambassador Ritter, in instructions to the German legation, com
plained that?
The facts that the Norwegian ships have apparently been
chartered to England for a long time, that English captains are
on board and that, as is being said, war materials for England
are being loaded on individual ships have evoked a most unfavor
able impression with the Reich Government. . . . It follows from
this that the Swedish Government has not dealt openly with us.&?
He further stated that the Swedish government?
recognizes the right of disposition of a third party thhe exiled
Norwegian Government^, it protects charter contracts which were
concluded against the wishes of the owners, and it demands of the
shipowners that they prove their clear and primary legal claims
before the courts.*®

?8

On September 26s libbentrop talked with the Swedish Charge d"
Affaires in Berlin, Counselor von Post, and accused the Swedes of stab
bing Germany in the back by recognizing British interests in the case,
libbentrop pointed out that since Great Britain was fighting on the
side of Bolshevism, ’’every action by Sweden favoring England was some71
thing on the order of suicide.”
The Germans also sought means of coercion to force the recalci
trant Swedes into a policy more compatible with German interests <> The
director of the Economic Policy Department requested the legation to
submit a review "of our economic relations with Sweden with special
regard to what possibilities we have for putting the thumbscrews on
72
the Swedes.”

The legation responded immediately, but the results

were hardly encouraging.

In the report, Minister Sehnurre summarized

the extent of Swedish exports to Germany in the past year, mentioning
also the Swedish concessions for the transit of goods overland to Norway
and Finland and the convoy services through Swedish territorial waters.
German counter-deliveries were cited, but as Sehnurre admitted, they
were insufficient to compensate for the amount of raw material and
finished products exported from Sweden.

Moreover, increased deliver-

! ;

ies from Sweden during the coming year were largely dependent on an
extension of credit to bridge the German deficit.

Sehnurre felt that

pressure could be applied upon Sweden by withholding German supplies
of coal and armaments, but by so doings

71I b i d . . x m , 585.
72l b i d . . X H I , 531.
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we would disrupt the German-Swedish trade on which we depend to
a much greater extent than do the Swedes* I would therefore
advise against stopping the shipment of coal and other deliver
ies to Sweden, because we would thereby defeat our plan * ,. ,
of making Sweden the arsenal of G e r m a n y ,73
Under the circumstances, the best method for effecting reprisals would
be to strike at the Gothenburg traffic which Sweden depended upon for
many of her raw materials*

This Germany could do with less harm to her

own interests, although Sehnurre admitted that Germany also derived
benefits from the traffic.
The Economic Policy Department concurred with Sehnurre1s views
and forwarded the report to Ribbentrop.

However, no action to shut off

the traffic was forthcoming, as the Germans were still not anxious to
antagonize the Swedes,

On October 1, it was reported that a Swedish

court of appeals had approved the arrest of one of the ships and had
thereby established a precedent which would probably be applied in the
other cases.

There also seemed no immediate danger that the ships

would attempt to break out of the ports.

On November 13, the British

protested that the Swedish courts were favoring German interests in
the ships.

The cases were still involved in litigation at the end of

19itl, and it seemed that the matter would be tied up indefinitely.

In

April, 19U2, some of the vessels attempted to escape to the West, but

ryj
the breakout proved unsuccessful.
In November, 19Ul, as discussions concerning the renewal of the

73Ibid,, XIII, 533.
^Fuehrer Conferences, 19U2, p, J4O, The attempted breakout was
reported at a Fuehrer conference on April 13, but the details were not
noted in the record of the proceedings.

German-Swedish trade agreement were in progress, the Swedish government
sent a memorandum to the Economic Policy Department enumerating Swedish
services and concessions granted to Germany since the outbreak of the
war in If39.
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The note, designed to strengthen Sweden*s bargaining

position in the negotiations, listed among other items the extensive
transport facilities provided for Wehrmacht troops on leave journeysj
from July 19i*0 to November 1, 191*1, 670,000 men had been conveyed across
Swedish territory between Germany and Norway, or via the "horse-shoe
traffic" between Narvik and Trondheim.

A vast quantity of supplies,

including military equipment, was also transported across Sweden every
month to bases in Norway.

The Swedish government had also granted

transit privileges to individual members of the Wehrmacht passing
through Sweden between Norway and Finlandj up to November 1, 5,100
passengers had been transported between Storlien on the Norwegian bor
der and Haparamda on the Finnish frontier.

In this same period, 5,000

carloads of military equipment had crossed Sweden to Haparanda.

Wehr

macht couriers traveling in Sweden had been granted considerable freedom
of movement by the Swedish authorities.
At least seventy ships transporting troops and war material to
Finland had passed through Swedish territorial waters escorted by Swed
ish naval vessels and aircraft.

German courier planes made extensive

use of the special flight privileges granted by Sweden, and hospital
planes and trains carried wounded German soldiers from Finland to
Norway.

To facilitate the transit of material to Finland, Sweden had

7^BGFP. XIII.
930.

The text of the Swedish note is given on pp. 927-
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permitted the installation of supply depots in the area of Lulea.

Sup

plies were transported from there to Finland in trucks leased from the
Swedish army which had also provided the Wehrmacht with tents and
stoves for winter use.
Trade between Sweden and Germany had expanded in value from 799*7
million kronor in 1938 to between 1,800 and 1,900 million kronor in 191*1.
For 191*2, the Swedes had granted credit to Germany of 100 million kronor
to cover the clearing deficit from 19l*l.

Many Swedish exports to Ger

many were now carried in Swedish vessels, freeing German ships for other
uses.

Since the port facilities at Narvik had been extensively damaged

in 19l*0, the Swedes had exported 1*5,000 tons of iron ore per day from
the alternate port of Lulet.

The harbor at Narvik had been partially

restored, however, due to the efforts of the Granesberg firm, one of
the principal exporters of Swedish iron ore.

The Swedish note also

cited the delivery of supplies to Finland as a major contribution to
the war effort there.

During 19l*l, Sweden sent quantities of flour,

potatoes, meat, butter and molasses, as well as other foodstuffs.
land had been allowed credits to the amount of 300 million kronor.

Fin
War

material delivered to Finland included ammunition, powder, signal
equipment, and other military supplies.
The German economists recognized Germany's dependence on Swedish
goods and services by agreeing to the delivery of much of the war mater
ial previously requested by the Swedish government.

In a secret protocol

signed on December 8, Germany agreed to supply? 15,000 binoculars, 11,000
field telescopes, 2000 light machine guns with accessories and ammuni
tion, 110 light field howitzers with ammunition, three batteries of
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long-barreled Skoda cannons with ammunition, a quantity of pistol ammunItion, and shortwave transmitters and receivers.

Delivery of many of

the requested items would be divided into monthly installments.

The

Germans were also considering granting licenses for the manufacture of
some of the ammunition and radio equipment in lieu of making deliveries.
On December 19, the protocol was supplemented by a general German-Swedish
economic agreement concerning trade between the two countries in 191*2.
Toward the end of 192*1, Hitler became convinced that the British
were planning an attack on Norway with the object of recapturing Narvik
and threatening the Swedish ore fields.

He ordered defenses in Norway

strengthened, and also planned to increase the naval and air forces in
that area.

On January 22, 192*2, at a Fuehrer conference, Hitler reported

that an Allied attack seemed imminent and that Sweden could be expected
to support the Allies in return for "Narvik and ore deposits near Petsame.
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Hitler also foresaw a threat to German shipping in the Baltic

if the British established a foothold in the North.
Germany at that time had several capital ships, including the
battle-cruisers Scharnhorst and Gnelsenau. and the cruiser Prinz Eugen.
stationed at Brest on the northwestern coast of France.

These vessels

were needed to defend Norwegian shipping, but to reach Norway or Germany
they would have to pass through the English Channel, risking possible
British attack.
fer the ships.

After much hesitation, Hitler finally decided to trans
On February 11 and 12, the ships escaped undetected

76lbld.. m i ,

988-989.

77Fuehrer Conferences» 191*2, p. 6.
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through the Channel, making the voyage to Germany intact.

The German

naval forces in Norway were reinforced in the spring of 19h2$ and Hit
ler’s fear of a British attack in that area diminished for the time
being.
It was during 19li2 that signs of friction between Germany and
Sweden became evident.

The German build-up in Norway convinced many

Swedish military leaders that this activity pointed to an invasion of
their own country, and in February Sweden’s forces were mobilized to
meet an expected attack.

The Swedish military establishment had been

vastly enlarged since 1939, with increased appropriations being spent
for armaments and war material.

While no German invasion materialized

during the crisis In February, many Swedes continued to fear Germany's
designs on Sweden, and at several times during the war fears of invasion
led to immediate mobilization.
That Hitler was becoming increasingly displeased with Sweden's
attitude was evident.

In July, 19U2, the German SS Chief, Himmler, in

formed his personal physician and confidant, Dr. Felix Kersten, that
Hitler had requested him to approach the Finnish government with the
proposition that Finland should invade and occupy Sweden.

Himmler

stated?
It is an impossible situation, this of having a neutral for
eign body in the midst of Adolf Hitler's Greater Germany. It
gives our enemies too many opportunities for countering our aims.
Sweden is the happy hunting ground of English spies. Part of the
Swedish press is openly anti-German. Sweden withholds from us
many of her valuable stores of riches, owned, some of them, by
foreign capital. With the monopoly of those stores, Germany9s
war effort would be greatly strengthened.78

*^Felix Kersten, The Memoirs of Doctor Felix Kersten (Garden

In return for her c©operationg
Finland would receive the northern half of Sweden, the areas
with a Finnish population and the Norwegian harbour of Kirkemes,
while Germany would annex central and southern Sweden to the
Greater German Reich.79
The Finnish foreign minister, Witting, was horrified by the proposal
and refused to consider such an idea, but he kept the Germans waiting
for an answer by stating that the question could not be decided until
the Finnish Parliament met in November.
The attitude of the Swedish press was one thorn in the side of
German officialdom which at times became particularly irritating.

The

Swedish government did bring pressure to tone down anti-German publica
tions at the beginning of the war, and the Germans exerted their own
Influence by cancelling advertisements of German firms which regularly
appeared in the Swedish papers.

However, censorship was not complete)

news of the treatment of Norwegians by German occupation troops led to
much irate criticism in the Swedish press, and the general tone of the
articles became Increasingly anti-German in 19l*2 as Germany experienced
military reverses in the Soviet Union and North Africa.

The failure to

control Swedish public opinion was grudgingly acknowledged by Dr.
,, , v .

■

City, N 0 Y. s Boubleday and Go., Inc., 19k7)> p. 125.
Dr. Kersten was a Finn who practiced a form of medicine which he
referred to as "Psycho-Neural Therapy," which consisted of the manipula
tion of the nerve endings aimed toward relaxing the nerves of the patient.
Himmler came to rely heavily upon this treatment and Kersten used his
position to aid various Scandinavian and Jewish prisoners of the Reich.
This will be dealt with more extensively in the next chapter. This book
is the narrative account written by Kersten at the close of the war.
^Felix Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs. 19lt0-19li5 (Londons Hutch
inson and Go., 1956), p. lii3. This is a different edition dealing with
the same material, but published later by Kersten in diary form.
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Goebbels, Hitler8s propaganda minister, when he wrote on April 21, 19l*3§
The Swedish press, especially the section hostile to the
Axis, is indulging in language that it dares to use only because
our military position is not very secure at the moment. Bat one
day there will be a change— and then we can talk differently to
Sweden.80
The motion pictures shown in Sweden also exhibited a disregard for the
wishes of Br. Goebbels,

Most productions were either Scandinavian,

English, or American in origin, in spite of a ready availability of
German-made films.
The unsympathetic attitude increasingly displayed by the Swedish
press and public opinion toward the Nazi cause was an indication of a
gradual trend in German-Swedish relations, a cooling off of the cooper
ation between the two governments which had been displayed up through
the beginning of 19l*2»

Although Germany still remained the predominant

power In the North and was able to exact certain concessions from the
Swedish government, each German military setback left the Swedes with
a measure of doubt in the wisdom of a policy tied too closely to German
interests and a renewed desire to resist farther encroachments on
Sweden's neutrality.
The Swedish government did not make any sudden moves to throw
off German influence, however, and most of the changes in policy came
about as a gradual evolution.

It was not until August, 191*3, that the

Swedes actually defied the Fuehrer by suspending the major provisions
of the transit agree&ent, or until 191*1* that trade between Germany and
Sweden was significantly reduced.

80

By then Hitler was on the defensive

Louis P. Lochner (ed.), The Goebbels Diaries. 191*2-191*3 (Garden
Oity, N, 1,3 Bbubleday, 191*8), p, 339»
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and could do little more than include Sweden as a target of his polemics.
By the beginning of I9UU5, an active German policy toward Sweden had been
largely superseded by one of reaction, and as German threats increased
in volume, their effectiveness was lost as Sweden turned her attention
to Allied counter-arguments„

CHAPTER If

THE DECLINE OF GERMAN INFLUENCE
As the fortunes of war continued to turn against Germany in 19li3
and an eventual Allied victory seemed assured, Sweden9s policies also
underwent a transformation.

While German forces were busy attempting

to recoup their losses in Russia and North Africa, the Swedish govern"*
ment had to reconsider whether its best interests lay in bowing to
Allied pressure and withdrawing some of the concessions which had been
granted to Germany following the Norwegian invasion in 19h0. The Swed
ish government finally announced on August 5, 19li3, "that an agreement
has been reached with the Reich, suspending German transit privileges
for war materials and for troops, effective August 15 and 20 respect
ively.

This did not apply to the transit of non-military goods or

civilian passenger travel, which was permitted until the following
April when even this was discontinued.
By September, 19U*, the only German traffic allowed through
Sweden consisted of hospital cars from northern Finland crossing Swedish territory enroute to Germany.

2

The concessions granted to Germany

for the flight of courier planes over Sweden were also severely cur
tailed .
In reprisal for these measures, two Swedish fishing boats were
fired upon and stark in August, 19^3, and several Swedish courier planes

^•Joachim Joesten, "Phases in Swedish Neutrality," p. 328.
^Scott, p. 270.
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were also downed by German fire.

The Gothenburg traffic was closed for

a time in the autumn of 191*3, when Germany refused to allow the Swedish
vessels safe passage through the German blockade.
This general harassment of Swedish ships and planes in the Baltic
area created much ill-feeling toward Germany in Swedish circles, and
the Allies took advantage of this in their efforts to wean Sweden away
from her close economic ties with Germany.

On September 23, 19l*3, the

Swedish government signed an agreement with Great Britain and the United
States which if carried out to the letter would have substantially re
stricted Sweden's exports to Germany.

Sweden promised?

To grant no further credits to the enemy except within certain
defined limits to Finland, to maintain the general price level
of their exports to the enemy for 191*3 to an amount equal in
value to at least 130 million kronor less than in 191*2, and to
include in this reduction specific quantities of various commod
ities to which the Allies attached importance. More far-reaching
reductions were to take place in 191*1*8 iron ore exports were to
be limited to 7.5 million tons a year in the proportion of not
more than two tons of ore for every ton of coal or coke imported
from the enemy. 3
The export of other types of ores and minerals was either to be restric
ted or prohibited entirely in 191*1*.
In practice, Sweden did not always adhere strictly to these,
quotas, and the amount of iron ore exported to Germany in 191*3 was above
Allied expectations for that year.

However, on January 11, 191*1*, Sweden

signed a trade treaty with Germany which was more in line with the
promises made to the Allies in their 191*3 agreement?
The clearing agreement to Germany would total about 700,000
kronor, of which i*J>0,000 would be made up of export quotas for
various commoditiesj this latter figure compared with 550,000
for 191*3. The balance was to be made up by invisible exports

^Toynbee, p 8 73.
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and a credit repayment,, Iron ore exports were to be limited to
7,000,000 tons instead of lO,Q0O,0OQj ball-bearings to 21,000,000
kronor-worth instead of i;5>,000,000.^
The shipment to Germany of Swedish-made ball-bearings was one
matter of particular concern to the Allies. The Swedish ball-bearings
were of especially high quality steel, and while they supplied only a
small portion of Germany’s total needs they were essential components
to such vital machinery as aircraft machines and other precision instru
ments of war.

Ball-bearings were also manufactured in Germany, but

during 19^3 Allied bombers destroyed most of the German plants at
Schweinfurt and slowed down production considerably.

Germany was now

more dependent than before on Swedish supplies, although Sweden in the
trade agreement with the Allies had promised to limit her exports of
this commodity to the Reich.

The principal manufacturer of ball-bear

ings in Sweden was the Svenska Kullagerfabriken. better known as the
S.K.F.

Daring the war, the S.K.F. shipped by air nearly $20,000,000

worth of ball-bearings and machinery to manufacture ball-bearings to
$
the Allies, which equalled nearly half the amount sold to Germany.
This Allied buying was Intended partially to preempt shipments of bear
ings to Germany, but the S.K.F,, foiled the plan by building increased
production facilities to meet the demand.

In May, 19hk} American and

British agents flew to Stockholm in an effort to persuade the company
to cut off its exports to Germany.

To add weight to their arguments,

the negotiators were also prepared to purchase available supplies of

kjfcdd., p. 7U.
^Scott, p. 269.

90
ball-bearings from the S.K.F.

During the discussions which lasted from

May 13 to June 8 exports to Germany were temporarily suspended.

The

S.K.F, was reluctant to limit its business with Germany, but the Allied
delegates were quite persuasive.

The fact that the Normandy invasion

took place as the negotiations were being concluded may have helped
convince the Swedes that they should take a benevolent view of the
Allied requests.

The Allied agents purchased about six million dollars

worth of Swedish ball-bearings, and in exchange the S.K.F. agreed to
reduce substantially its exports of ball-bearings to Germany.

6

The

company continued to abide by this arrangement, shipping only a limited
quantity to the Germans until October lj>, 19l*l*, when the S.K.F. halted
the exports completely.
During the last half of 191*1*, trade between Germany and Sweden
amounted to a fraction of its former volume.

In July, Hitler was still

worried that a Russian breakthrough in the Baltic would interfere with
his imports of Swedish ore, "which are of decisive importance for our

^Stanton Griffis, Lying in State (Garden City, N. T.% Doubleday,
1952), p. 118} Toynbee, p. 76) and Joesten, "Phases in . .
p. 329.
These sources all report the agreement to limit exports, but
give conflicting accounts of the amount of the reduction. Griffis, an
American businessman turned amateur statesman and one of the delegates
to the Stockholm conference, states that the S.K.F. agreed "to ship
less than ten per cent of its former quotas to Germany," On the other
hand. The War and the Neutrals asserts that "deliveries -to Germany
were to be reduced from 2,000,000 to 1*70,000 kronor-worth a month be
tween 8 June and 12 October, and to satellite and occupied countries
from 1*00,000 to 298,000 kronor-worth a month," which would be a consi
derably larger'.export figure than Griffis reports. Joesten's figures
are closer to those given in The War and the Neutrals t he states that
shipments "were limited to about twenty -per cent of the total of the
preceding year."
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war economy# and to the cons traction of the new submarine force.

7

In

September, however, the Swedish government announced the closing of all
Swedish ports in the Gulf of Bothnia and the Baltic Sea west to the
Falsterbo Channel.

This closure, which went into effect on September

27, resulted in a substantial reduction in Swedish exports to Germany.
The Germans responded by abrogating the Gothenburg traffic agreement
and declaring on November 9 that the Baltic was a zone of operations
in which all vessels, including Swedish, would be sunk without warning.
Sweden protested and announced that she would not hold trade negotia
tions with Germany for the following year.

By January 1, 191*E>, all

trade with Germany had ceased, primarily because companies would no
longer extend insurance and credit to those engaged in such commerce.
From 191*3 until the end of the war, Sweden also defied Hitler by
extending aid to the other Scandinavian nations which were in a less
fortunate situation.

Sweden maintained diplomatic relations throughout

the war with the Norwegian government-in-exile, which was headquartered
in London, and allowed the Norwegian government to maintain a legation
in Stockholm.

In November, 19l*3, anti-German riots broke out at the

University in Oslo and some of the student leaders were deported to
Germany.

Sweden vigorously protested this action and the following

year some of the students were repatriated.
Perhaps the most defiant act of the Swedish government in support
of the Norwegians was the establishment, in the spring of 19l*3, of a
training center for a police force to be composed of Norwegian refugees

^Fuehrer Conferences, 19l*l*, p. £9.
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in Sweden.

The force was set up to provide a nucleus of trained men

who could be ready to return to Norway and restore order in the event
of a German evacuation of that country.

At first the group was small,

consisting of only 1,500 men, and was regarded as a civilian undertaking, although the training included "instruction and exercises in
the use of gas, smoke bombs, and explosives with a view to active

8

sabotage and the prevention of sabotage.”

The strength of this force

was increased in both 19li3 and 19liU» and the training became more mili
tary in character, with operations carried out in war-like conditions
under regular Swedish army officers.

By the end of 19Wt, the Norwegian

reserve force numbered 12,000 men, trained and equipped by Sweden, but
under the administration of the Norwegian government in London.
Sweden also gave aid to Danish refugees who managed to escape
from their homeland.

At first, after the Germans invaded Denmark,

they attempted to establish a "model protectorate" in that country,
and expected the Danes to behave themselves accordingly.

However, the

Danes were unappreciative of their benefactors, and by I9J4.3, the German
administrators were plagued by a growing amount of sabotage.

The

Germans ordered the Danish government to impose severe penalties for
sabotage, and to declare a state of emergency, but the Danes refused.
Hitler then ordered that certain planned measures against Denmark,
known by the code name Operation Safari. be put into effect. On August
29, 19ii3» the Germans arrested the King, the members of his cabinet,
and other influential military and government leaders, declaring a

%oynbee, p. 191.
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state of martial law.

Hitler had feared that the Danish fleet might

try to escape to Sweden and ordered Danish vessels seized and brought
into port.

However, some Danish crews scuttled their ships rather

than let them fall into German hands, or managed to reach Sweden in
spite of the German navy.

Subsequent German administration in Denmark

assumed a sterner character, and in September, 19^3, it was learned
that the Germans planned to round up and deport all Danish Jews.

The

Swedish government sent a note to Berlin protesting this action, and
offered to take the Jews to Sweden instead.

The Germans ignored this

proposal, but many Danes hid Jewish persons in their homes, from where
they later escaped to Sweden via the Danish underground.

By the war's

end, 18,000 Danish refugees had fled to Sweden, where they were sup
ported largely by the Swedish government.

The Swedes also trained a

small Danish police force comparable to the Norwegian police.
By the middle of I9h3> the Swedish government began to give
thought to post-war aid to the occupied countries.

What one Swedish

official has referred to as a "minor Marshall plan" was set up to
provide "massive deliveries of food-stuffs and other necessities after
9
the liberation."

An enormous amount of aid in the form of food,

clothing and medical supplies was provided both during and after the
war to such nations as Norway, Denmark, and Holland.
The Swedes were more restricted in their desire to aid Finland,
for the Finns were fighting with their German allies against the

% i s Excellency M. Gunnar Hagglof, "A Test of Neutrality? Sweden
in the Second World War," International Affairs, XXXVI (April, I960),

16^.
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Russians and were therefore directly involved in the war.

By 19kh$

however, it became obvious to the Finnish leaders that they would have
to seek an end to the conflict.

Finland's manpower and resources were

both nearly exhausted in spite of German aid, and she began in the
summer of 19^1* to make peace overtures to the Soviet Union.

When

Hitler learned of Finland's intentions, he threatened dire consequences,
but Finland proceded with her plans for a separate peace.

On September

5, hostilities ceased between Finnish and Russian forces, but the fight
ing in Finland did not end at this point.

One of the Soviet conditions,

laid down before the armistice was signed, decreed that all German
troops should be out of Finland by September 15 or be disarmed and
turned over to the Russians.

This was an impossible condition for

Finland to meet, even if the Germans had been willing to cooperate.
As it was, German troops in northern Finland retreated slowly toward
the Norwegian border, leaving a wake of destruction behind them.

The

Finnish government had been aware of this possibility and ordered the
population of northern Lapland evacuated.

Many of the inhabitants fled

across the border into Sweden, where they found refuge from the German
forces.

The devastation in Lapland was appallingj of 113,531 buildings

existing before the war, 1*1,306 or thirty-six per cent were destroyed
by the Germans during their retreat.^

Fast quantities of farm equip

ment were also destroyed and many head of livestock slaughtered.

The

rich nickel mines in Lapland were put out of working order before the
Germans evacuated the area and rendered useless to the Finns.

^Charles Leonard Lundin, Finland in the Second World War
(Bloomington? Indiana University Press, l^fT?), p. 21*^.
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On September li*, the Germans launched an attack. Operation TanneOst. on the Finnish island of Suursaari, but the attempt to land troops
was unsuccessful.

A separate attack, termed Tanne-West. had been

planned against the Aaland Islands, which are located at the entrance
to the Gulf of Bothnia.

However this was shelved because of probable

Swedish opposition (the islands belonged to Finland, but the population
was largely Swedish in origin).

The German government feared an attack

on the islands might adversely affect the "continued deliveries of
Swedish ore and ball-bearings."
Following Finland“s exit from the war, Sweden once more provided
that country with quantities of food and other vitally needed supplies,
as she had done in 19^0 after the first Russian conflict.
The final year of the war saw the successful culmination of
efforts by the Swedish government to aid political prisoners of the
Reich.

Throughout the conflict, Sweden had maintained a particular

interest in the welfare of the Norwegian and Danish prisoners who had
been interned in German concentration camps as punishment for their
resistance.

A direct appeal to Hitler seemed useless, but it eame to

the attention of the Swedish government that there was another import
ant German official who might be approached.
Heinrich Himmler, the commander of the SS, was a man who habit
ually showed little mercy to political prisoners.

But he was also a

sick man who suffered intensely from stomach cramps and the only person
who seemed able to relieve his pain was his masseur, Dr. Felix Kersten.

Ibid.. p. 233o See also, Walter Warlimont, Inside Hitler’s
Headquarters (New Yorks Frederick A. Praeger, 196^), p. 1*72.
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Kersten was a citizen ©f Finland who also had lived in Holland until
the German invasion in 19M>.

He had treated Himmler for several years

and gradually acquired a considerable Influence over his patient*.
Walter Schellenberg, Himmler8s chief of intelligence, stated thats
So great was Himmler's faith in Kersten8s ability thathe
submitted everyone in the Third leich whom he regarded as
important to a sort of test, which consisted of a physical
examination by Kerstenj for Kersten claimed that through his
manipulations he could feel the nature of the nervous reac
tions and the nervous energy of an individual* and thereby
judge his mental and intellectual capacities
Kersten had no sympathy for the Nazi cause, but he was a shrewd bar
gainer who saw the advantages of his position and used Himmler8s
dependence onhim to obtain more humane treatment
of prisoners.

for various groups

In doing so, h© made many enemies, but "he was able to

bounce unharmed out of all difficulties.

What usually happened was

that so much confusion was created around him that you never knew
..13
where you were."
Kersten8s pleas met with varying degrees of suc
cess depending on Himmler's illnessj when Himmler was in desperate
pain, he would grant Kersten nearly anything he desired in return for
his administrations.
One of Kersten8s projects involved the case of seven Swedish
businessmen, representatives of two firms, the Svenska Taendsticks
A. B„, known as the Swedish Match Trust, and the L 0 M0 Erickson Co.
The men were arrested in Warsaw in July, 19U2, and charged with espion
age.

At their trial in Germany, two were acquitted, one was given a

1P

Walter Schellenberg, The Labyrinth (New Yorks Harper and Bros.,
1^56), p. 30f>.
13I b i d . , p . 306.
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prison sentence, and the remaining four were sentenced to deatho

Kers-

ten interceded in their behalf with limmler, who at first was unwilling
to grant their release. Kersten persisted in his efforts, however, and
finally managed to convince Hiramler ©f the importance both the Finnish
and Swedish governments attached to the case,,

When Hiramler finally

decided in Kersten*s favor, four of the Swedes were repatriated with
little delay.

The remaining three were released in December, 19Ui, as
"I I

a "sort of personal Christmas gift® to Kersten.
Kersten*s efforts to free the seven Swedes were also aided and
encouraged by Walter Sehellenberg, and Kersten states that after he
discovered Schellerberg’s favorable attitude he consulted the latter
before "every move."

1!?

Sehellenberg, however, claimed after the war

that "Ribbentrop and Kaltenbrunner regarded me as responsible for the
pardon and liberation of the seven so-called Warsaw Swedes, and they
tried to show that my intervention in this case . . . was a great political blunder."

16

The conflict for credit in this case was apparently

resolved in Kersten*s favor at the Nuremberg trial of Sehellenberg.
As the historian, H. R. Trevor-Roper observes in his introduction to
The Kersten Memoirs t
.SplffljjLenbiarje^ tried to claim that it was he who saved the men,
ais" the witnesses were examined it became clear (as the
Court observed) that their rescue was really the work of the
then unknown Dr. Kersten.^7

■^Felix Kersten, The Memoirs of Dr. Kersten. p. 11*7.
entire account of the case is set forth on pp. 133-150.

Kersten*a

lgIbid.. p. 13U.
^Folke Bernadette of Wisborg, The Curtain Falls; the Last .SSQL
of the Third Reich (New Yorks A. A. Knopf, X9li5), p. lltO.
l^Felix Kersten, The Kersten Memoirs, p. 13n.
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The release of the Warsaw Swedes, however, was eclipsed in 191*5
by a much more spectacular rescue operation,,

As the Allied forces

approached Germany, many neutral observers feared that Hitler would
carry out his threat either to blow up the concentration camps or
evacuate the inmates rather than let them fall into Allied hands. A
vast rescue operation, sponsored by the Swedish government and under
the auspices of the Swedish led Cross, was planned and ultimately
carried out, resulting in the release of nearly 23,000 Scandinavian
and Jewish prisoners from German concentration camps.

As in the case

of the Warsaw Swedes, the credit for the success of the operation is
claimed by more than one individual.
Once more Kersten ascribes an important role to himself.

In

191*3, the strain of living ip Nazi Germany began to tell on him, and
he requested Hiramler9s permission to move his family to Sweden*

Hiram-

ler at first refused but later agreed to this proposal, provided Kers
ten promised to return to Germany at regular intervals to continue his
treatments.

Kersten moved to Stockholm on September 30, 191*3»

While

in residence there, he conferred several times with Foreign Minister
Guenther, who was aware of Kersten*s continuing efforts to secure the
release of the Warsaw Swedes.

Guenther and Kersten discussed the pos

sibility of achieving a large-scale rescue of Scandinavian and other
prisoners of the Reich, and Kersten agreed to use his influence in an
attempt to further such a scheme.

Before he returned to Germany,

Guenther gave him lists of prisoners whose release the Swedish government was seeking.

X8

l 8 I b i d . . p. 187.
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In April, 19Ui, Kersten again met with Guenther and reported to
him on his attempts to prepare the ground for the negotiations whieh
would be necessary before a mass rescue operation could be attempted.
He was certain that Himmler could be convinced of the merits of such a
proposal, but there would be formidable opposition from such officials
as Ribbentrop, Goebbels, and Kaltenbrunner, the chief of the German
security forces.

During their meeting, Guenther disclosed the details

of the projected rescue operation as he wished Kersten to present them
to Himmlers
Hie first stage of the plan . . * was to get the Norwegians
and the Danes out of the German concentration camps. Whenever
possible they should be sent to Sweden, who took upon herself
the obligation of interning them until the end of the war* If
this could not be arranged, Sweden was also ready to construct
properly enclosed camps, where the prisoners would be guarded
until the end of the war by the Swedish police. Sweden would
also guarantee that they did not return to Norway and Denmark
before then. . . . If none of these Swedish proposals were
acceptable to Himmler, at least it had to be arranged for the
Scandinavian prisoners to be assembled in a part of Germany
where they were out of danger from bombing. Sweden would then
be prepared to feed them and supervise their health arrangements.
The best way would be for this to be done under the auspices of
the Swedish Red Cross.^
When Kersten returned once more to Germany, he presented these
proposals to Himmler.

Himmler rejected outright the plan to send pri~

'soners to Sweden, but he would consider the possibility of interning
them in one camp where they could be looked after by representatives of
the Red Gross.

Extensive negotiations were necessary however before

any details could be agreed upon.

Kersten did succeed in persuading

Himmler to release fifty Norwegian students and fifty Danish policemen

^ Ib id . . pp. 226-227.
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who were detained in German prisons and provide them with transportation
A A

to their homes in time for Christmas.

(Himmler apparently had a sent

imental side to his nature, for he was apt to be more susceptible to
Kersten's requests during the holiday season®) Aside from his interest
in helping the Scandinavian prisoners, Kersten also regularly pleaded
the cause of French, Belgian, Dutch and Jewish prisoners.

Before leav

ing for his Christmas holiday in Sweden, Kersten succeeded in securing
Himmler1s promise to release ”1,000 Dutch women, together with Norwegian
and Danish women and children, students and policemen," to be transported
to Sweden, and also "800 Frenchwomen, 1*00 Belgians, 500 Polish women and
between two and three thousand Jews," who were to be sent to Switzerland.

21

Sweden would have to provide transportation for the Dutch and

Scandinavian prisoners, and Himmler agreed to allow Swedish buses to
enter Germany for this purpose®
While Kersten^ negotiations were in progress, a similar idea had
occurred to another individual®

Count Folfce Bernadotte was a member of

the Swedish Royal family, and the Vice-President of the Swedish Red
Gross, and in this capacity he also devised a plan to achieve the re
lease of the Scandinavian prisoners following approximately the same
formula as the project originally outlined by Guenther.

Immediately

after the war, in June, 191*5, Bernadotte published a book, entitled in
English, The Curtain Falls. in which he claimed a large measure of cre
dit for the conception of the entire rescue operation.

He insists that

such an idea came to him around the beginning of 191*5, at which time he

20Ibid.. p. 227

2^Xbid., p . 230.
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conferred with other members of the Red Gross and the Swedish government
who encouraged him to approach Himmler and attempt to obtain the release
of the Norwegian and Danish prisoners in Germany,,

1 Swedish led Cross

expedition was already enroute to Germany in February of 19^5, with the
purpose of collecting Swedish-born wives of German citizens who were
now widowed or homeless, and this would make an excellent pretext for
Bernadotte's visit to Germany.
Accordingly, Bernadotte flew to Berlin, and on February 12 he had
an interview with Himmler, whom he described at first glance as a "quiet
22

little man who looks like a harmless country schoolmaster.'*

During

the meeting, he proposed to Himmler that the Norwegian and Danish pri
soners in German concentration camps be interned in Sweden until the
end of the war, but this request met with a flat refusal.

Bernadotte

then suggested that members of the-led Gross might do useful work In
the camps where Scandinavians were now interned.

When Himmler agreed

to this, he added that the work would be facilitated if "the Norwegians
and Danes in question should be collected into two camps, one for each
group," J Himmler again proved amenable to the request and "also agreed
that the aged, the sick and mothers should be allowed to return to Nor
way after having been assembled in the camps.

He did not even raise

any objection to the admission of Swedish Red Gross staffs to the camps
to assist in the collection of the prisoners."

2li

Before leaving Germany

Bernadotte secured Rlbbentrop's consent to the Swedish proposals.
bentrop insisted that the transportation of the prisoners must be

22Bernadotte, p. h2.
%bid.

^^ibid., p. £2.

Rib-
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provided by the Swedish Bed Cross, since Germany had none to spare, and
Bernadotte promised that this would be arranged.

He then flew back to

Sweden and reported to the Swedish government, which approved the ar
rangements .
By larch 12, a Bed Gross expedition financed by the Swedish
government crossed the border between Denmark and Germany.

The exped

ition was tinder the command of Colonel Bjerck and included one hundred
buses and trucks to transport the prisoners to the agreed-upon camp
sites.

During the month of March, thousands of Scandinavian prisoners

from concentration camps all over Germany were transferred to an assem
bly point at Meuengamme, near Hamburg, from where they were later
evacuated to Denmark.
While the Scandinavian prisoners were being collected, negotia
tions were also in progress aimed at saving the prisoners of other
nationalities who were still interned in Germany.

As Allied forces

approached, Hitler ordered that the prisoners should be evacuated to
other parts of Germany or blown up with the camps rather than let than
fall into Allied hands.

Both Kersten and Sehellenberg attempted to

persuade Himmler that the best course for Germany to follow would be
to deliver the camps intact to the Allies, rather than force their
evacuation.

In February, Kersten had been introduced in Stockholm to

Hilel Storch, a representative of the World Jewish Congress, and to
gether they drew up a plan to save as many Jewish prisoners as possible.
Kersten flew back to Germany and started discussions with Hiramler which
lasted for a week.

On March 12, he obtained Himmler9s promise that the

concentration camps would be handed over to the Allies on their approach.

Hitler's orders to blow up or evacuate the camps would not be carried
out, killing of Jews was to be prohibited, and they were henceforth "to
2<
receive the same treatment as other prisoners
Sehellenberg states In his autobiography that he also persuaded
26
Himmler to Issue orders not to evacuate the concentration camps.
However, about the first of April, he received a report that prisoners
at Buchenwald were being removed. In January, 191*6, at Nuremberg,
Sehellenberg testified as a witness that Kaltenbronner had contacted
Hitler and succeeded in countermanding Himmler1s decree.

27

When Schel-

lenberg reported this to Himmler, he again intervened and ordered a
halt to the evacuations.
On the night of April 20=21, an extraordinary interview took
place between Himmler and Norbert Masur, a representative of the Swed
ish branch of the World Jewish Congress.

Accompanied by Kersten, Masur

had flown incognito from Stockholm to Berlin with a safe-conduct signed
by Sehellenberg.

The meeting took place at Kersten®s country estate,

Hartzwalde, where they were also joined by Sehellenberg and Himmler8s
secretary, Dr. Brandt.

Masur asked for the release of all Jews still

interned in Germany, and in any case wanted assurances that no more
would be killed or evacuated from the camps.

Himmler promised to re

lease one thousand Jewish women from Ravensbruck to be transported to

^Kersten Miemolrs. p. 277.
96
Sehellenberg, p. 380,
27

International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War SESffiinals Before the International Military Tribunal^Nuremberg, Germany!
International Military Tribunal, 191*7), IV, 378 and 381-382.

Sweden, although "he stipulated that they should be described as Polish
women, not Jewesses, in order to get around Hitler’s express orders
against the release of Jewish prisoners."

28

Himmler also promised to

release certain prisoners from a list compiled by the Swedish foreign
office, and reiterated his assurances that the remaining prisoners would
not be evacuated.

Following the negotiations, Brandt and Sehellenberg

both assured Kersten and Masur that they would see to it that Himmler
kept his part of the agreement and would secretly attempt to raise the
number of Jews to be released.

29

The Scandinavian rescue operation and the subsequent release and
transportation of Jewish prisoners to Sweden was an operation for which
the Swedish government and the individuals responsible for its success
deserve the highest praise.

However, after the war, a conflict appeared

between those claiming credit for the achievement.

Both Kersten and

Bernadotte assert In their writings that they first conceived of the
undertaking and carried through the negotiations with Himmler which led
to the release of thousands of prisoners.

However, Kersten was unknown

to the general public, while Bernadotte was an internationally acclaimed
figure.

Bernadotte*s book does not mention Kersten and scarcely credits

the role of the Swedish government.

The book covers Bernadotte's con-

ferences with Himmler in which he claims to have originated the idea of
a rescue mission and his subsequent negotiations to arrange the transfer of prisoners to Neuengamme, and from there to Denmark and Sweden.

^ Kersten Memoirs. p. 289.
- 29For an account of the negotiations, sees Kersten Memoirs. pp.
286-290, Memoirs of Felix Kersten. pp. 232-23U, and Sehellenberg, pp.
392-391*.
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Kersten, on the other hand, was in a less fortunate situation
following the German collapse.

He was living in Sweden when the war

ended and immediately applied for Swedish citizenship.

His application

was supported by Guenther, but in July, 191*5, the Swedish government
fell from power.

The new government refused to grant Kersten citizen

ship and Guenther was told that the original documents concerning
Kersten had been lost.

30

The Butch, however, were not so ungrateful.

In 191*8, the Butch

government set up a special commission, headed by Professor N. W„
Posthuraas, the director of the National Institute of War Bocumentation,
to inquire into the actual facts of the case.

The committee made ex

tensive Investigations and refuted the charges that Kersten had been a
Nazi or had profited financially from his efforts.

31

They also uncov

ered the evidence of his humanitarian work, for which in August, 1950,
he was made a Grand Officer of the Order of Orange-Nassau.

In 1952,

the Butch government nominated him for the Nobel Peace Prize, although
no award was given that year.
In February, 1953, the historian, H« 1. Trevor-Roper published
a provocative article In The Atlantic Monthly, entitled, “Kersten,
Himmler, and Count Bernadotte."

Relying heavily upon the findings of

the Butch commission, he brought to public attention the failure of the
Swedish government to recognize Kersten's achievements and Bernadotte5s
attempt to claim all the credit for the venture.

3%ersten Memoirs, p. 18.

Trevor-Roper asserts

From the Introduction by H„ R» Trevor-

Roper.
^Ibtd.. p. 19. See also H« R. Trevor-Roper, "Kersten, Himmler
and Count Bernadotte," The Atlantic Monthly. February, 1953, p. 1*5®
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that while Sehellenberg supported Bernadotte11s account of his expedi
tion, Sehellenberg owed him a debt of gratitude.

When the war ended,

Sehellenberg sought asylum in Sweden and actually stayed at Bernadotte*s
house until he was extradited by the Allies.

(He was charged with war
32
crimes and Bernadotte later testified on his behalf at Nuremberg.)
In fact, Trevor-Soper charges that much of Bernadotte8s book "had been
ghost-written, at high speed11 by Sehellenberg, and that he "still had

a copy in his possession when he finally surrendered to the Allies."
The article in The Atlantic Monthly aroused
4
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Sweden, and in April,

some controversy in
*'

1953, the magazine published both a statement by

ErikBoheman, the Swedish Ambassador in Washington,
buttal by Trevor-Roper.

33

and a letter of re

While Boheman refuted the charges against

Bernadotte, he admitted that the article had caused the Swedish foreign
office to re-examine the case.

3k

On 29th April, 1953, & stormy debate took place in the Riksdag
in the course of which the Swedish government8s treatment of
Kersten was roughly criticized as small-minded and ungrateful.
Six months later the government yielded. On 30th October, 1953,
Felix Kersten was admitted to Swedish citizenship.35
The final action of the Swedish government substantiates in large
part the belief that without Kersten*s intervention the Scandinavian
rescue operation might not have been carried out to its successful con
clusion.

The recognition of Kersten*s achievements, however, does not

mean that Bernadotte accomplished nothing.

Certainly, as an official

3gIbld.
OliWJPIHl— W

33

Introduction to The Kersten Memoirs. p. 17.
3^The Atlantic Monthly. April, 1953, p. 2I4.
^ In tro d u c tio n to The Kersten Memoirs. pp. 20-21.

107

representative of the Swedish Red Gross and the Swedish government, he
was in a better position to make the necessary arrangements for the
transfer of the prisoners than was a person who, although working with
the Swedish government, was essentially a private individual.

The un

fortunate part of the whole affair lay in the fact that Bernadotte
apparently, whether consciously or unconsciously, accepted the role of
a hero without giving credit where it was due in other quarters.
Bernadotte did play a certain role toward the end of the war
which was not directly connected with the rescue of the prisoners.

As

early as August, 19h2, Sehellenberg had come to the conclusion that
Germany might not win the war and had approached Himmler with the sug
gestion that an "alternative solution" to ending the war should be
sought while Germany still possessed the strength to negotiate with
her enemies.

“36

After some hesitation, Himmler agreed that Schellen-

berg's arguments had merit, but he refused to commit himself to a
course of action.

By 19k%> however, it was obvious that Germany could

not hold out much longer and Kersten also was pushing Himmler to do
what he could to negotiate and avoid further bloodshed.

On April 21,

when Hiramler was at Hartzwalde for the conference with Masur, he sud
denly asked Kersten whether he had "any access to General Eisenhower or
the Western Allies?"

When Kersten answered that he did not, Himmler

requested him to "undertake to fly from Sweden to Eisenhower's head
quarters and open discussions with him about the immediate cessation
of hostilities."-^

Himmler was willing to negotiate a surrender on the

36gchellenberg, p. 309®
^ Kersten Memoirs, p. 273.
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western front, provided Germany could continue to press the war in the
East against the Russian forces.

Kersten answered that he did not feel

qualified for the job, but he suggested that Himmler might broach the
matter to Count Bernadotte at their next meeting, as Bernadotte would
have more influence with the Allies.
On April 23, Himmler*s emissary, Sehellenberg, met with Berna
dotte and asked him whether he would take a message to Eisenhower stat
ing that Himmler wished to meet with him in order to bring about a
German capitulation in the West.

Bernadotte felt that "it would be

better if Hiramler’s wishes were transmitted to the Swedish Government,
who could then, if they were willing, transmit them to the representsTD
tives of the Western Powers."
He thought it was improbable that the
Allies would accept a surrender only in the West, but he agreed to take
a letter from Himmler to Foreign Minister Guenther, provided Hiramler* s
offer to capitulate included German troops in Norway and Denmark.

Himm

ler was acting under the assumption that Hitler would soon be dead and
that he would assume the leadership of Germany.

But when Hitler com

mitted suicide, his successor proved to be Admiral Doenitz.

By then,

Himmler had already been Informed through Bernadotte that the Allies
had refused to negotiate with him, and that any German surrender would
have to include the eastern front as well as the West.
Himmler was not the only German leader to put out peace feelers
via Sweden.

Fritz Hesse, in the book Hitler and the English, describes

a mission to Stockholm which he undertook at Ribbentrop’s request in

B ernadotte, p . 105.

February, 19ltE>.

While in Sweden, Hesse sounded out representatives

from the West, but again they were unwilling to negotiate a peace which
would not include the last.

Ribbentrop then ordered Hesse to approach

the Russian representative in Sweden, Madame Kollontal, with roughly
the same proposal, except in this case Germany was investigating the
possibility of concluding a separate peace in the East.

Hitler, how

ever, had been informed of the negotiations in Stockholm and decided
that the whole idea was useless.

He informed Ribbentrop at this point

that any farther contact with a foreign power would be forbidden, so
the project was subsequently dropped.
As the war drew to a close, the Swedish government became par
ticularly concerned over the possibility that fighting might break out
in Norway.

The destruction which had been- caused in Finland during the

German retreat led to fears that a repetition might occur if German
forces evacuated Norway.

Kersten reports in his Memoirs that, at

Guenther’s urging, he took up the problem with Himmler, pointing out
to him that the Allies were exerting strong pressure on Sweden to
occupy Norway; if Sweden failed to do so, there was also the danger
that Russian troops might invade Norway, which would be a worse fate
for Scandinavia.Himmler was impressed by Kersten's reasoning and
discussed the matter with Hitler, who flatly refused to consider the
surrender of German troops in Norway.
Hitler also overruled his military commanders on this point.

39Fritz Hesse, Hitler and the English (Londons Allan Wingate,
Ltd., 19$h), pp. 200-210.
k°Kersten Memoirs, p. 271.

At
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a Fuehrer conference on March 10, Jodi reported?
A request from the Commanding General, Norway, asking for permission to withdraw from the northern Norwegian area to the
region south of Narvik because of lack of supplies. . . The
Fuehrer believes that if we evacuated Narvik we might be pro
viding Sweden with an opportunity to enter the war against us,
since she would then have excellent connections with the AngloAmericans. WThe request to evacuate troops from the area was denied.
In spite of the official cold water thrown on any plans for peace
in the North, both Himmler and Sehellenberg did attempt to do what they
could to maintain the status quo in that area.

Toward the end of March,

Himmler Informed Kersten that he had sent orders to the SS In Norway
"to avoid opening a new theatre of war in the North."^2
When Boenitz took over after Hitler’s death, he conferred with
Schellenbergs
Sehellenberg suggested that we should offer to surrender
Norway to Sweden and ask at the same time that the German army
of occupation should be allowed to enter Sweden and be Interned
there. . . . In the course of the discussion it was disclosed
that through Sehellenberg, Himmler had sometime before raised
this question with Sweden and that that country had expressed
in confidence, its willingness to agree to the internment of
troops on its territory.h3
Doenitz was not in favor of this plan since he felt that surrendering
to a neutral nation might endanger future negotiations with the Allies,
and at any rate, there was always the possibility that Sweden might
hand German prisoners over to the Russians.

He told Sehellenberg that

he might Investigate the matter further, but he was thankful when the

^Fuehrer Conferences. 192*5, p. 75*
ii2
Kersten Memoirs, p. 272.
k^Karl Doenitz, Memoirsg Ten Years and Twenty Days (Clevelands
The World Publishing Co., 1959), p. 1*56.
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final capitulation which he arranged with the Allies "put an end to

hk

these vague, under-the-counter negotiations.0

The end of the war found Sehellenberg in Stockholm, attempting
to arrange a German surrender in Norway, but meeting with little success.
(Doenitz apparently neglected to Inform the German commander in Norway,
General Boehme, as to Sehellenberg"s authority in the matter.)

On May

7, Germany capitulated and Sweden finally broke off diplomatic relations
with the Belch.

The Swedish government refused to have anything more

to do regarding the situation in Norway, "for obviously both the Norweg
ian and the Danish problem were part of the surrender negotiations as a
whole.
Sweden emerged from the war relatively unscathed and maintaining
her position as a neutral nation.

Alone of the northern European coun

tries, she had escaped German invasion and conquest, although for six
years her politicians had walked a tightrope, precariously balanced be
tween German demands and Allied pressure.

Throughout the war, Germany's

leaders had weighed the value of Swedish exports in their plans, and
undoubtedly debated whether it would not be simpler to invade Sweden
and enjoy the fruits of their conquest, than to rely on the whims of a
government which could be swayed both by public opinion and Allied re
quests to deny certain items to Germany,.

In any account, Sweden was

allowed to ride out the war virtually unmolested in comparison to her
northern neighbors.

’Why this was the case, and whether the course of

the war could have been changed by a German invasion of Sweden, are
subjects which will be examined in the conclusion.

M lb id . . p. h$7

^ S e h e lle n b e rg , p. i+ ll.

CONCLUSION

Following the Norwegian Invasion, many European observers wondered
why Sweden had been spared when her western neighbors had suffered the
fate of German conquest.

The answer to this is composed of several fac

tors, but In general It may be said that an Invasion of Sweden at that
time would have been both unnecessary and costly to Germany*

In 19h0,

Sweden was already supplying Germany with iron ore, ball-bearings, and
other Items vital to a war-time economy.

But in the event of an invasion

these supplies would be at least temporarily interrupted, and in the case
of the Iron ore, the plants which furnished power to the northern mines
and to the iron ore railroad would have been blown up by the Swedes them
selves rather than left intact for the Germans to utilize*

In this

respect, Hitler stood to lose more than he could gain by an invasion.
Had Hitler decided to invade Sweden, he would also have had to
expend considerably larger forces than had been necessary in the Banish
and Norwegian invasions.

Sweden had a large land area and her army,

although small, was well equipped and would certainly have put up a
stout resistance.

Moreover, as one Swedish authority has since pointed

out, a large-scale operation in the North would have delayed for some
time the main attack in the West which Hitler was anxious to launch.^
An additional factor to be considered was the attitude of the
Soviet Union.

On April 13, 19l*0, Molotov informed the German ambassador

that the Soviet Union would not look kindly upon any attempted invasion

1Hffggl8f,

p. 160.
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of Sweden, since the continued neutrality of that nation was definitely
in the Soviet interest.

2

Hitler could not afford to anger Stalin,

since he needed Russian support for the present.
The fact that the balance of power in the North was tilted in
Germany's favor has been cited by some authorities as one of the reasons
Hitler was able to wring so many unneutral concessions from the Swedes
without resorting to an invasion of Sweden.

The Swedish diplomat,

Gunnar HSgglUf, has written that “the basic condition of neutrality is
the existence of a balance of p o w e r I n September, 1939, the Swedes
were among the first to proclaim their neutrality In the struggle be
tween Germany and the western powers.

At that time, Sweden did not

feel threatened by either side, but was determined to carry on normal
economic and diplomatic relations with all the belligerents.

In Decem

ber, Sweden concluded trade agreements with both Germany and Great
Britain.

Although more Swedish exports were shipped to Germany than

to the West, this was not an unusual situation, since the Germans cus
tomarily purchased large quantities of Swedish iron ore and provided
Sweden with the coal and coke which she imported for home consumption.
In spite of difficulties arising from Germany's refusal to recognize
the Swedish four-mile zone, good relations between the two countries
generally prevailed.
During the Winter War between the Soviet Union and Finland,
Germany kept silent while Sweden assisted Finland with weapons and
humanitarian supplies.

Hitler was concerned, however, with the attempts

^Sontag and Beddie, p. lljO.
%agglb*f, p. 166.

m
of the western Allies to intervene in the Finnish dispute, since he
correctly interpreted the Allied gesture as a pretext to establish
enemy troops in the vicinity of the northern Swedish ore fields and
halt the shipments of iron ore to Geraany.

With the conclusion of

peace in March, 19l*0» the Allies had no immediate excuse for interven
ing in the North, but as Hitler’s military advisors were quick to point
out, a new pretext for stopping the ore traffic would soon be found.
The Norwegian invasion in April grew out of Germany’s need to insure
the continuation of Swedish exports as well as the desire of the naval
commanders for bases in Norway.

The Norwegian invasion had the effect

of cutting Sweden off from the West and, as a result, the Germans were
able to exact concessions from the Swedish government for the transit
of both troops and war material to Norway.

Although the Swedes con-

tinned to proclaim their neutrality, the historian, Bruce Hopper, has
observeds
It will always be difficult . . . to understand why the
Swedish government did not admit that the transit agreement
was a violation of neutrality, accepted under the threat of
force ma.jeure. Allied forces certainly could not at that time
have supported Sweden. . . . Further, the Balance of Power in
northern Europe had ceased to operate? the neutrality principle
went into abeyance.**
This was acknowledged on the German side by Minister zu Wied in
Stockholm when he reported on May 8, 19hl* that Sweden “fully recognizes
c■?
the realities of the power situation in the Baltic area.,SJ As Hitler
had predicted in his plans for Operation Barbarossa, Sweden allowed the
transit of a German division across Sweden to Finland, permitted the

**Bruce Hopper, Swedent A Case Study in Neutrality,11 Foreign
Affairs. XXIII (April, 19k$), hh2.
^DGFP, XII, 735.
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use of Swedish territorial waters for the transportation of troops and
supplies, and granted extensive concessions to the German air force and
navy.
From 191*0 through 191*2, the Swedish government did make some
efforts to maintain an independent policy.

After the first concessions,

it refused to allow the transit of additional German troop divisions
through Swedish territory and resisted attempts t© have the Norwegian
ships in Swedish harbors returned to the Norwegian owners.

Although

the German authorities grumbled at these measures, they were reluctant
to apply sanctions against Sweden since the Swedes had met the majority
of German demands, and in a sense, Germany had become dependent on
Swedish goods and services.

During this time, however, there was never

any doubt that Germany controlled events in the North, and Sweden’s
resistance was partially a token gesture to convince the western powers
and the rest of Scandinavia that Sweden had not become totally sub
jected to Hitler’s demands.
toward the end of 19i*2, Hitler suffered several military setbacks
and the inevitability of German victory seemed to diminish accordingly.
\

Although until Finland’s capitulation Germany maintained a dominant
i
position in the North, Hitler was soon too deeply committed in other
areas to give serious consideration to his relations with Sweden.

The

northern balance of power, which had largely vanished from sight after
Norway’s capitulation, began to show new signs of life, and the Swedish
government did not hesitate to take advantage of the situation.

Begin

ning in 19l*3» the concessions were withdrawn one by one until by 191*5
Sweden had completely thrown off the Nazi yoke, and Hitler was reduced
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to Issuing dire warnings which the Swedes knew wotald not be implemented.
Trade between Germany and Sweden alas© came to a standstill as the Swedes
responded to Allied pressure to halt their contributions to Germany's
war industry.

Toward the end ©£ the conflict, Sweden was able to imple

ment her own policies, using the Nazis1
1 fear of Allied retribution as
a tool to pry loose thousands of Scandinavian prisoners from Hitler's
concentration camps.
A hypothetical question, but on© which deserves an examination,
is whether it would have been to Hitler's ultimate advantage to have
achieved an outright occupation of Sweden.

Although there is some

evidence that a German invasion of Sweden was contemplated at various
times during the war, few of the German leaders seem to have taken the
idea very seriously.

Hfgglgf mentions the fact that early in 191*0 a

memorandum containing a plan for the occupation of Lulei and the iron
ore railway circulated among the higher-ranking German officers, but it

6

seems Mto have been dismissed by the German leadership without comment.18
If Hitler had invaded Sweden in 191*0, ©sports to Germany of iron ©re
and other commodities would not have been reduced as they were by the
Swedes in 191*1*.

(This, however, is assuming that the facilities at the

northern mines had not been damaged beyond repair.)

Germany’s war effort

would certainly not have been so severely hampered at the conclusion of
the war by shortages of material.

The Germans also could have made free

use of Swedish territory without the necessity of prolonged bargaining
sessions at the conference table.

6® g g l$ f, p . 160.

These advantages, however, must be
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weighed against the initial expenditure of troops necessary for a suc
cessful invasion and the necessity of maintaining an occupation force
to guard against sabotage and rebellion.

The end result of an invasion

of Sweden would have been to tie up, for the duration of the war, valu
able German troops which comld have been used more profitably elsewhere.
Even free access to the supplies of Swedish ore would not have been
likely to compensate for an overall decrease in the number of troops
available to fight a two-front war.
After 191*0, the possibility of a German Invasion of Sweden dimin
ished in proportion to the extension of German forces in other theaters
of the war.

In 191*6, The Illustrated London Mews circulated a statement

made to the Soviet authorities by General von Falkemhorst's chief-ofstaff, Lieutenant-General Hudolf Bambler, in which he revealed that in
December, 191*2, he was ordered to prepare a plan for an attack on Sweden
from Norway.

The operation, known by the code name Polar Fox, was to

take place in the summer of 191*3° However, the failure of the German
offensive in the Soviet Union that summer resulted in the cancellation
of the

plan.?

After this, Hitler could not conceivably spare the troops

necessary for further ventures in the North as is evidenced by his fail
ure to hold even Finland in check, and the Swedes, under Allied pressure
and looking after their own postwar interests, proceeded to assert their
independence.

^Cyril Falls, "Aftermath of Wars Germany's Designs on Sweden,"
The Illustrated London News. August 3, 191*6, p. 12i*.
According to Bambler, he submitted the idea to Warlimont, who
wanted the invasion to take place during the winter of 191*3« In his
book, however, Warlimont makes no mention of a planned attack on
Sweden.

In the final analysis, Hitler’s policy toward Sweden was one
based on a realistic appraisal of Germany’s position in the North visa-vis that of any other power or group of powers» Until his invasion
of Norway, he had to be content to share the spoils with the western
Allies and to restrain his demands on Sweden, but after the invasion
and as long as Germany’s position in the North constituted a threat to
Sweden's independence, he was able to force the Swedes into an unneutral
position without talcing overt action himself.

With the exception of

flights of fancy concerning his "New Order in Europe,” Hitler's policy
took advantage of the existing situation without risking German involve
ment.

Since the Swedish government was also pursuing a realistic policy,

Hitler was able to achieve his aims during the first half of the war
without having to invade Sweden, and after 19k? an occupation of that
country would have proved inimical to the German cause.

Viewed his

torically, German policy toward Sweden during World War Two provides a
graphic illustration of the fact that a neutral nation need not be just
a static element in the planning of a belligerent, and that with a
realistic approach, a belligerent can utilize this neutrality to serve
its own interests to the extent that the neutral fears the alternative
consequences.
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For the purposes of this study, the most valuable material was
included in the published collections of German documents.

The Docu

ments on German Foreign Policy proved indispensible, the only limitation
being the fact that the series concludes with the entry of the United
States into the war in 19l;l.

The three sets of volumes covering the

Nuremberg trials had varying degrees of usefulness.

Nazi Conspiracy

and Aggression is well indexed and contains a great many documents per
taining to the Norwegian invasion as well as other topics.

The Nurem

berg material was actually more valuable than the footnotes would
indicate, since in many instances the same documents were reproduced
in the Documents on German Foreign Policy, and I chose to cite the
latter source instead.

Other important collections of documents include
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Blitzkrieg to Defeats Hitler’s War Directives and. Nazi-Soviet Relations.
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The records of the Fuehrer Conferences, reproduced on micro-

film, provided a valuable account of the day to day planning of German
naval operations» Other German documents, such as the White Book Noe ^
were produced in the first place as a propaganda device, and must be
read with some awareness of this fact*
The published diaries and memoirs of military and political per
sonalities were another source which proved extremely helpful to an
understanding of both German and Allied aims and operations.

On the

German side, General Haider’s war journals provided brief but succinct
comments on the military scene.

Warlimont’s book was more useful for

an understanding of the organizational structure of the German military
establishment.

The memoirs of Admiral Raeder and Admiral Doenitz and

the book by Vice Admiral Rage provided a complete picture of the German
navy in World War Two.

The diaries of Ciano aftd Goebbels, and the

memoirs of von Weizsaecker and Schellenberg were also useful and varied
contributions to a knowledge of German policy.

In general, the diaries

of German leaders provide a truer picture of the situation than do the
memoirs, which in most cases are written several years after the fact
and tend to whitewash certain aspects of the war which their authors
would prefer to forget.
A great deal may also be learned from the writings of the Allied
or neutral observers.

Events during the last phase of the war are

illuminated by the works of Folke Bemadotte and Felix Kersten.

A

rather pro-German account is provided by Sven Hedin, and Arvid Fredborg
presents the problems confronting a Swedish journalist in wartime Berlin.
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The Norwegian viewpoint is provided by G» J„ Hambro and Halvdan Koht,
both leaders of the Norwegian government prior t© the invasion.,

Manner-

heimIIs memoirs are a biased, bat valuable firsthand Finnish source 0
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Stanton Griffis*
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There are many excellent secondary sources dealing with various
aspects of the thesis.

For an overall look at Swedish policy during

the war, The Power of Snail States by Annette Baker Fox and The War and
the Neutrals edited by the Toynbees each contain a chapter which proved
invaluable.

There are also three articles by Gunnar Hagglof, Bruce

Hopper, and Joachim Joesten ("Phases in Swedish Neutrality") which con
tain interesting interpretations and analyses of Sweden's position.
Hitler's military strategy is the subject of accounts by Telford
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Taylor, B. H. Liddell-Hart, F„ H0 Hinsley, Anthony Martienssen, and
Peter Mendelssohn.

The first two sources are the most authoritative

and contain much pertinent information on the planning of Operation
Weseruebung. Martienssen8s book is a good secondary supplement to the
Fuehrer Conferences.
The one outstanding book dealing with economic warfare is
MedlieottBs The Economic Blockade. The author is primarily concerned
with Great Britain"s strategy, but includes German policy in his dis
cussion.

There are two other books dealing with German economic policy,

but they were both published about 191*1 and so give only the general
picture at the beginning of the war.
In the bibliography, I have included several basic works on
Swedish history and the economic geography of the Scandinavian states
which were useful for background knowledge.

The general books on

Scandinavia by Henning Friis and Franklin 0„ Scott were also quite
helpful in this respect.
For current commentary on the events as they occurred, The Hew
York Times contains a wealth of information, and the publication Hews
of Norway, issued by the Norwegian government^ press representative
in the TJ. S., keeps the reader informed of happenings in the Scandin
avian countries.

